Musings on Digital Identity

Category: Post-Quantum

OpenID Presentations at November 2026 OpenID Workshop and IIW

OpenID logoI gave the following presentation updating people on developments in the OpenID Connect Working Group at the Monday, November 2, 2026 OpenID Workshop at CrowdStrike:

I also co-presented this material on the transition to post-quantum cryptography with Joseph Heenan:

The next day, I gave this invited “101” session presentation at the Internet Identity Workshop (IIW) on Tuesday, November 3, 2026:

Post-Quantum Signatures for JOSE and COSE

Congratulations to Mike Prorock and Orie Steele on the publication of “ML-DSA for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)” as RFC 9964! This is a major step forward towards enabling widely-available post-quantum signatures for the Internet and devices.

The abstract from the RFC is:

This document specifies JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) serializations for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA), a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) digital signature scheme defined in US NIST FIPS 204.

As I discussed at TDI 2026 and will discuss tomorrow at EIC 2026, transitioning to post-quantum algorithms is a multi-step process:

  1. Developing PQ algorithms
  2. Creating standards for using PQ algorithms
  3. Updating software to use PQ standards
  4. Deploying the updated software in your environment

Mike and Orie successfully completed step 2 for JOSE and COSE signatures today!

The JOSE and COSE algorithm identifiers for ML-DSA were actually registered with IANA in July 2025, once it was clear that the document was stable. Some deployments already exist. For instance, Yubico has created prototype Yubikeys (hardware passkeys) supporting ML-DSA signatures. The algorithms are now recommended in the FIDO2 CTAP2.3 Server Requirements.

I played a few supporting roles progressing this spec. I co-chaired the COSE Working Group with Ivaylo Petrov where the work occurred. Ivo and I made a consensus call in May 2025 to standardize only one private key representation – the seed. (As I often advocate, “Standards are about making choices”.) And I requested early allocation of the algorithm identifiers with IANA in July 2025.

Orie said to me while the spec was in AUTH48 with the RFC Editor: “This may be one of the most consequential RFCs I ever create.” I completely agree! And special congratulations, Mike Prorock, on your first RFC!


Here’s a slide from my TDI 2026 presentation on what’s hard about deploying post-quantum cryptography. I’ll make the same case tomorrow at EIC.

What's Hard About Post-Quantum Cryptography

Post-Quantum Presentation at TDI 2026

FBK logoI gave the presentation “The Post-Quantum Apocalypse Is Already Upon Us” at the 4th International Workshop on Trends in Digital Identity (TDI 2026) in Verona, Italy. My talk abstract was:

“The future is already here — it’s just not evenly distributed” is an apt description of the impact of quantum computers on cryptography and its use in our identity systems. We all know that quantum computers are predicted to be able to break the cryptographic algorithms used in today’s identity systems (RSA, Elliptic Curve, etc.) at some unknown point in the future. But this possibility has huge implications right now. “Disruptive” is an understatement. Every piece of software using cryptography has to be updated before Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) are created (and we don’t know when that will be). “Store now — decrypt later” attacks require action now, not later. Are you using software and protocols that may never be updated for the post-quantum world (such as SAML)? Are you comfortable with your migration path to fully quantum-safe software? This presentation will help you evaluate what you need to do when and how and why to avoid being a victim of the Post-Quantum Apocalypse.

This resulted in an active and useful discussion on what the practical barriers are to updating our computing environments to be secure in the advent of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs), and why it’s critical to start now. Topics included cryptographic algorithms, standards, updating software, and possibly the most difficult thing of all – acting in the presence of uncertainty.

See the presentation deck I used (pptx) (pdf).

Thanks to the FBK Center for Cybersecurity for the great event!

Post-Quantum Presentation at TDI 2026

WGLC for JOSE and COSE HPKE Specifications

IETF logoHybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) was standardized by RFC 9180 in February 2022. It is “hybrid” in the sense that it combines public key cryptographic operations to establish a symmetric key with symmetric cryptographic algorithms using the established key to do the content encryption. It has its own set of registries where Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs), Key Derivation Functions (KDFs), and Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms used with HPKE are registered. The KEMs registered include post-quantum KEMs.

There’s been a multi-year effort to bring HPKE encryption to applications using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and COSE encryption. As has been done by other protocols using HPKE, such as MLS, both the JOSE and COSE HPKE specifications made choices about which cryptographic operations make sense together in the specification’s context, as well as which HPKE features to use. Making those choices within the working groups is part of what made these specifications take a while. There’s also been a deliberate effort to keep the specifications aligned where it made sense.

The good news is that both the JOSE and COSE HPKE specifications have matured to the point where Working Group Last Call (WGLC) has started for them. The two WGLCs are intentionally running concurrently because the drafts are closely related and their functionality is intended to be aligned. They run until Friday, June 20, 2025.

Please participate in the WGLCs on either the jose@ietf.org or cose@ietf.org mailing lists, respectively. The messages to reply to are:

The specifications entering WGLC together are:

Finally, I’ll note that a new IETF HPKE working group has recently been formed to make updates to the HPKE specification. Among the chartered updates are adding post-quantum KEMs and hybrid combined KEMs.

Thanks to all in both working groups who helped us reach this point!

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