The OpenID Connect Extended Authentication Profile (EAP) ACR Values 1.0 specification has been approved as a Final Specification by the OpenID Foundation membership.
As I wrote at the start of the review period, the specification is glue that ties together OpenID Connect, W3C Web Authentication, and FIDO Authenticators, enabling them to be seamlessly used together.
There are three useful normative definitions in the spec – two ACR values and one AMR value, all used in ID Token claims.
The two ACR values defined by the specification are:
phr
:
Phishing-Resistant. An authentication mechanism where a party potentially under the control of the Relying Party cannot gain sufficient information to be able to successfully authenticate to the End User’s OpenID Provider as if that party were the End User. (Note that the potentially malicious Relying Party controls where the User-Agent is redirected to and thus may not send it to the End User’s actual OpenID Provider). NOTE: These semantics are the same as those specified in [OpenID.PAPE].phrh
:
Phishing-Resistant Hardware-Protected. An authentication mechanism meeting the requirements for phishing-resistant authentication above in which additionally information needed to be able to successfully authenticate to the End User’s OpenID Provider as if that party were the End User is held in a hardware-protected device or component.
The AMR value defined by the specification is:
pop
:
Proof-of-possession of a key. Unlike the existinghwk
andswk
methods, it is unspecified whether the proof-of-possession key is hardware-secured or software-secured.
I believe this approval completes the work of the EAP working group.