Musings on Digital Identity

Month: June 2025

Final OpenID Connect EAP ACR Values Specification

OpenID logoThe OpenID Connect Extended Authentication Profile (EAP) ACR Values 1.0 specification has been approved as a Final Specification by the OpenID Foundation membership.

As I wrote at the start of the review period, the specification is glue that ties together OpenID Connect, W3C Web Authentication, and FIDO Authenticators, enabling them to be seamlessly used together.

There are three useful normative definitions in the spec – two ACR values and one AMR value, all used in ID Token claims.

The two ACR values defined by the specification are:

  • phr:
    Phishing-Resistant. An authentication mechanism where a party potentially under the control of the Relying Party cannot gain sufficient information to be able to successfully authenticate to the End User’s OpenID Provider as if that party were the End User. (Note that the potentially malicious Relying Party controls where the User-Agent is redirected to and thus may not send it to the End User’s actual OpenID Provider). NOTE: These semantics are the same as those specified in [OpenID.PAPE].
  • phrh:
    Phishing-Resistant Hardware-Protected. An authentication mechanism meeting the requirements for phishing-resistant authentication above in which additionally information needed to be able to successfully authenticate to the End User’s OpenID Provider as if that party were the End User is held in a hardware-protected device or component.

The AMR value defined by the specification is:

  • pop:
    Proof-of-possession of a key. Unlike the existing hwk and swk methods, it is unspecified whether the proof-of-possession key is hardware-secured or software-secured.

I believe this approval completes the work of the EAP working group.

WGLC for JOSE and COSE HPKE Specifications

IETF logoHybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) was standardized by RFC 9180 in February 2022. It is “hybrid” in the sense that it combines public key cryptographic operations to establish a symmetric key with symmetric cryptographic algorithms using the established key to do the content encryption. It has its own set of registries where Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs), Key Derivation Functions (KDFs), and Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms used with HPKE are registered. The KEMs registered include post-quantum KEMs.

There’s been a multi-year effort to bring HPKE encryption to applications using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and COSE encryption. As has been done by other protocols using HPKE, such as MLS, both the JOSE and COSE HPKE specifications made choices about which cryptographic operations make sense together in the specification’s context, as well as which HPKE features to use. Making those choices within the working groups is part of what made these specifications take a while. There’s also been a deliberate effort to keep the specifications aligned where it made sense.

The good news is that both the JOSE and COSE HPKE specifications have matured to the point where Working Group Last Call (WGLC) has started for them. The two WGLCs are intentionally running concurrently because the drafts are closely related and their functionality is intended to be aligned. They run until Friday, June 20, 2025.

Please participate in the WGLCs on either the jose@ietf.org or cose@ietf.org mailing lists, respectively. The messages to reply to are:

The specifications entering WGLC together are:

Finally, I’ll note that a new IETF HPKE working group has recently been formed to make updates to the HPKE specification. Among the chartered updates are adding post-quantum KEMs and hybrid combined KEMs.

Thanks to all in both working groups who helped us reach this point!

OpenID Federation draft 43 Incorporating Feedback from Interop Event

OpenID logoDraft 43 of the OpenID Federation specification has been published. A number of features in draft 42 were discussed during the recent OpenID Federation interop event and the changes made in draft 43 are largely a result of conclusions reached there and resulting discussions that followed.

Before the interop, there were 40 open issues. As a result of the progress made at SUNET, and the ongoing engagement of interop participants since then, we’re now down to 17 open issues. And 9 of those propose extension specifications, post-final work, or reviewing the text.

The changes made in -43 are detailed in the Document History section.

Thanks all for the significant progress towards finishing the specification!

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