Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs draft -08 addresses additional Area Director review comments. A security consideration about utilizing audience restriction in combination with proof-of-possession was added. Thanks to John Bradley for working on the additional wording with me.
The specification is available at:
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I’m pleased to announce that Nat Sakimura, John Bradley, and I have created an OAuth 2.0 Discovery specification. This fills a hole in the current OAuth specification set that is necessary to achieve interoperability. Indeed, the Interoperability section of OAuth 2.0 states:
In addition, this specification leaves a few required components partially or fully undefined (e.g., client registration, authorization server capabilities, endpoint discovery). Without these components, clients must be manually and specifically configured against a specific authorization server and resource server in order to interoperate.
This framework was designed with the clear expectation that future work will define prescriptive profiles and extensions necessary to achieve full web-scale interoperability.
This specification enables discovery of both endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.
This specification is based upon the already widely deployed OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 specification and is compatible with it, by design. The OAuth Discovery spec removes the portions of OpenID Connect Discovery that are OpenID specific and adds metadata values for Revocation and Introspection endpoints. It also maps OpenID concepts, such as OpenID Provider, Relying Party, End-User, and Issuer to their OAuth underpinnings, respectively Authorization Server, Client, Resource Owner, and the newly introduced Configuration Information Location. Some identifiers with names that appear to be OpenID specific were retained for compatibility purposes; despite the reuse of these identifiers that appear to be OpenID specific, their usage in this specification is actually referring to general OAuth 2.0 features that are not specific to OpenID Connect.
The specification is available at:
An HTML-formatted version is also available at:
Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs draft -07 addresses review comments by our Area Director, Kathleen Moriarty, as well as comments by Hannes Tschofenig and Justin Richer. This should hopefully enable IETF last call.
The specification is available at:
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Draft -06 of the JWS Unencoded Payload Option specification addresses review comments by our Area Director, Kathleen Moriarty. This should hopefully enable IETF last call.
The specification is available at:
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Draft -05 of the JWS Unencoded Payload Option specification reworked the security considerations text on preventing confusion between encoded and unencoded payloads.
The specification is available at:
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I know that some of you have been following the IETF’s work on the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Working group on creating a Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) equivalent of the JSON-based cryptographic data formats produced by the JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) Working group. I’m happy to announce that work has now started on a CBOR Web Token (CWT) specification: a CBOR mapping of the JSON Web Token (JWT) security token format that was built using the JOSE specifications. While I expect JSON and the JOSE/JWT specs to continue be used in most Web, PC, phone, tablet, cloud, and enterprise contexts, the COSE specs and now CWT are designed for use in constrained environments, such as those for some Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
Just as it was important to have a JSON-based security token format for applications using JSON, it will be important to have a CBOR-based security token format for applications using CBOR. CBOR Web Token (CWT) fills that role. Note that what is actually defined is a general cryptographically secured CBOR data structure, enabling CWTs to be used as general application payloads for CBOR-based applications.
The abstract of the specification is:
CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. CWT is a profile of the JSON Web Token (JWT) that is optimized for constrained devices. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value.
My thanks to Erik Wahlström and Hannes Tschofenig for helping to make this happen!
Finally, I’ll note that just as the suggested pronunciation of JWT is the same as the English word “jot”, the suggested pronunciation of CWT is the same as the English word “cot”. So welcome to “cots”!
The specification is available at:
An HTML formatted version is also available at:
Draft -04 of the JWS Unencoded Payload Option specification addresses the shepherd comments. Thanks to Jim Schaad for his careful review. The primary change was adding additional security considerations text, including describing when “crit” should be used.
The specification is available at:
An HTML formatted version is also available at:
Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs draft -06 addresses the remaining document shepherd comment – adding use case diagrams to the introduction.
The updated specification is available at:
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