The Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) specification has been updated to address issues identified by Roman Danyliw while writing his shepherd review. Thanks to Samuel Erdtman for fixing an incorrect example.
The specification is available at:
An HTML-formatted version is also available at:
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has published a Proposed Recommendation (PR) for the Web Authentication (WebAuthn) specification, bringing WebAuthn one step closer to becoming a completed standard. The Proposed Recommendation is at https://www.w3.org/TR/2019/PR-webauthn-20190117/.
The PR contains only clarifications and editorial improvements to the second Candidate Recommendation (CR), with no substantial changes. The next step will be to publish a Recommendation – a W3C standard – based on the Proposed Recommendation.
The OpenID Connect Federation 1.0 specification is being developed to enable large-scale federations to be deployed using OpenID Connect. It enables trust among federation participants to be established through signed statements made by federation operators about federation participants.
The design of this specification builds upon the experiences gained in operating large-scale SAML 2.0 federations, and indeed, is authored by people having practical experience with these federations. The primary authors are Roland Hedberg and Andreas Ã’¦kre Solberg, with additional contributions by Samuel Gulliksson, John Bradley, and myself, as well as members of the OpenID Connect working group, which is the home of the specification.
A key innovation that differentiates OpenID Connect federations from most SAML 2.0 federations is that OpenID Connect federation employs hierarchal metadata, where participants directly publish statements about themselves, versus the aggregated metadata approach used by many SAML 2.0 federations, where the federation operator publishes a single file concatenating all the metadata for all the federation participants.
The specification was just updated so that the latest version can be discussed at a SURFnet OpenID Connect “Wisdom of the Crowd” session today.
The latest version of specification is available at:
This URL always points to the latest published version:
Please review and/or implement this important specification and send your feedback to the OpenID Connect working group!
Key ID confirmation method considerations suggested by Jim Schaad have been added to the Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) specification. Per discussions in the working group meeting in Bangkok, it’s now time for the shepherd review.
The specification is available at:
An HTML-formatted version is also available at:
The JSON Web Token (JWT) Best Current Practices (BCP) specification has been updated to address the review comments from Security Area Director (AD) Eric Rescorla. Thanks to Eric for the review and to Yaron Sheffer for working on the responses with me.
Note that IETF publication has already been requested. The next step is for the shepherd review to be submitted and responded to.
The specification is available at:
An HTML-formatted version is also available at:
The Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) specification has been updated to addresses a few additional Working Group Last Call (WGLC) comments. All of the (few) changes were about improving the clarity of the exposition. I believe that this completes addressing the WGLC comments.
Thanks to Roman Danyliw for helping to categorize the remaining comments that needed to be addressed.
The specification is available at:
An HTML-formatted version is also available at:
Now that the Security Event Token (SET) specification is RFC 8417, the SecEvent working group is working on defining the SET delivery mechanisms. This week, both the push-based and poll-based SET delivery specs have been updated to simplify their exposition and reduce duplication of text between the drafts. Thanks to Annabelle Backman for doing the bulk of the recent work on the push-based delivery spec. The latest versions of both specs contain these updates:
In addition, the latest version of the poll delivery spec also contains this update:
The specifications are available at:
HTML-formatted versions are also available at:
The IETF Token Binding working group has completed the core Token Binding specifications. These new standards are:
As Alex Simons recently wrote, it’s time for token binding. Especially now that the core specs are done, now’s the time for platforms and applications to deploy Token Binding. This will enable replacing bearer tokens, which can be stolen and reused, with Token Bound tokens, which are useless if stolen. This is a huge security benefit applicable to any tokens used over TLS, including browser cookies, OAuth access tokens and refresh tokens, and OpenID Connect ID Tokens.
Congratulations especially to the editors Andrei Popov, Dirk Balfanz, Jeff Hodges, Magnus Nyström, and Nick Harper and the chairs John Bradley and Leif Johansson for getting this done!
I likewise look forward to timely completion of related Token Binding specifications, which enable use of Token Binding with TLS 1.3, with OAuth 2.0, and with OpenID Connect.
Use of standards accelerates innovation. Oxymoron? Not at all!
Read Alex Simons’ description of how using robust standards like JWT is accelerating innovation when prototyping decentralized identity systems.
Check out Alex Simons‘ and Pamela Dingle‘s blog post “It’s Time for Token Binding“. Now that the IETF Token Binding specs are essentially done, it’s time to ask those who write TLS software you use to ship Token Binding support soon, if they haven’t already done so.
Token Binding in a nutshell: When an attacker steals a bearer token sent over TLS, he can use it; when an attacker steals a Token Bound token, it’s useless to him.
W3C has published a second W3C Candidate Recommendation (CR) for the Web Authentication (WebAuthn) specification. The second Candidate Recommendation is at https://www.w3.org/TR/2018/CR-webauthn-20180807/.
This draft contains a few refinements since the first candidate recommendation but no substantial changes. The new CR was needed to fulfill the W3C’s IPR protection requirements. The few changes were based, in part, upon things learned during multiple interop events for WebAuthn implementations. The working group plans to base coming the Proposed Recommendation on this draft.
The three core IETF Token Binding Specifications have been sent to the RFC Editor, which means that their normative content will no longer change. It’s time to move implementations to version 1.0! The abstract of the Token Binding over HTTP specification describes Token Binding as:
This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP servers to cryptographically bind security tokens (such as cookies and OAuth tokens) to TLS connections.
We describe both first-party and federated scenarios. In a first-party scenario, an HTTP server is able to cryptographically bind the security tokens it issues to a client, and which the client subsequently returns to the server, to the TLS connection between the client and server. Such bound security tokens are protected from misuse since the server can generally detect if they are replayed inappropriately, e.g., over other TLS connections.
Federated token bindings, on the other hand, allow servers to cryptographically bind security tokens to a TLS connection that the client has with a different server than the one issuing the token.
This document is a companion document to The Token Binding Protocol.
This is a huge step towards cryptographically protecting data structures that had previously been bearer tokens, such as browser cookies, refresh tokens, access tokens, ID Tokens, etc., so that they can only be used by the intended party. Congratulations especially to the editors Andrei Popov, Dirk Balfanz, and Jeff Hodges, as well as the chairs John Bradley and Leif Johansson for getting us to this important milestone!
The three specifications are:
The Security Event Token (SET) specification is now RFC 8417. The abstract describes the specification as:
This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data structure. A SET describes statements of fact from the perspective of an issuer about a subject. These statements of fact represent an event that occurred directly to or about a security subject, for example, a statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on behalf of a subject. This specification is intended to enable representing security- and identity-related events. A SET is a JSON Web Token (JWT), which can be optionally signed and/or encrypted. SETs can be distributed via protocols such as HTTP.
SETs are already in use to represent OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout tokens and to represent Risk and Incident Sharing and Coordination (RISC) events. Thanks to my co-editors, members of the IETF ID Events mailing list, and members of the IETF Security Events working group for making this standard a reality!
The OpenID Connect Token Bound Authentication specification has been updated in response to developer feedback and in anticipation of the IETF Token Binding specifications finishing. Changes were:
tbh” value doesn’t include any trailing pad characters, line breaks, whitespace, etc.(The representation of the Token Binding ID in the ID Token is unchanged.)
Thanks to Brian Campbell for doing the editing for this draft.
The specification is available at:
A new draft of the Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) specification has been published that addresses the Working Group Last Call (WGLC) comments received. Changes were:
Thanks to Samuel Erdtman and Hannes Tschofenig for contributing to the editing for this version and to Jim Schaad and Roman Danyliw for their review comments.
The specification is available at:
An HTML-formatted version is also available at:
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata specification is now RFC 8414. The abstract describes the specification as:
This specification defines a metadata format that an OAuth 2.0 client can use to obtain the information needed to interact with an OAuth 2.0 authorization server, including its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.
The specification defines a JSON metadata representation for OAuth 2.0 authorization servers that is compatible with OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0. This specification is a true instance of standardizing existing practice. OAuth 2.0 deployments have been using the OpenID Connect metadata format to describe their endpoints and capabilities for years. This RFC makes this existing practice a standard.
Having a standard OAuth metadata format makes it easier for OAuth clients to configure connections to OAuth authorization servers. See https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-parameters.xhtml#authorization-server-metadata for the initial set of registered metadata values.
Thanks to all of you who helped make this standard a reality!
I gave the following presentation during the June 2018 Identiverse Conference:
News included:
Action items included:
The OAuth Device Flow specification (full name “OAuth 2.0 Device Flow for Browserless and Input Constrained Devices”) has been updated to address comments received to date from the IETF last call. Thanks to William Denniss for taking the pen for this set of revisions. Changes were:
The specification is available at:
An HTML-formatted version is also available at:
This week the OpenID Certification program won the 2018 European Identity and Cloud Award for Best Innovation at the European Identity and Cloud (EIC) conference. This is actually the second award for the OpenID Certification program this year and only the latest in a series awards recognizing the value and impact of OpenID Connect and certification of its implementations.
On this occasion, I thought I’d take the opportunity to recount the awards that OpenID Connect, the specifications underlying it, and its certification program have been granted. To date, they are:
My sincere thanks to Kuppinger Cole for their early recognition of potential of OpenID Connect, for calling out the value of OAuth 2.0, JWT, and JOSE, and to both IDnext and Kuppinger Cole for recognizing the importance and global impact of OpenID Certification!
Speaking of impact, I can’t help but end this note with data that Alex Simons presented at EIC this week. 92% of Azure Active Directory (AAD) authentications use OpenID Connect. There’s no better demonstration of impact than widespread deployment. Very cool!
We’ve updated the Security Event Token (SET) specification to address feedback received from Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) members. We’ve actually published three versions in quick succession in preparation for tomorrow’s evaluation by the IESG.
Draft -11 incorporated feedback from Security Area Director Eric Rescorla and IANA Designated Expert Ned Freed. Changes were:
Draft -12 incorporated feedback from Adam Roach, Alexey Melnikov, and Alissa Cooper. Changes were:
Draft -13 incorporated feedback from Martin Vigoureaux. Changes were:
The specification is available at:
An HTML-formatted version is also available at:
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