

# OpenID Enhanced Authentication Profile (EAP) Working Group

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#### OpenID What is the EAP WG?

- Charter at <a href="http://openid.net/wg/eap/">http://openid.net/wg/eap/</a> ...
- "Develop a security and privacy profile of the OpenID Connect specifications that enable users to authenticate to OpenID Providers using strong authentication specifications. The resulting profile will enable
  - use of IETF Token Binding specifications with OpenID Connect and
  - integration with FIDO relying parties and/or other strong authentication technologies."

## OpenID Two EAP Specifications

- Token Bound Authentication
  - Defines how to apply Token Binding to OpenID
     Connect ID Tokens
  - http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-tokenbound-authentication-1 0.html
- EAP ACR Values
  - Defines "acr" values strong authentication profiles
  - http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-eap-acrvalues-1 0.html

### OpenID Token Binding Update

- IETF Token Binding specs ready for IETF last call
- OAuth Token Binding spec
  - Defines Token Binding of OAuth 2.0 access tokens, refresh tokens, and authorization codes
- Connect Token Binding spec
  - Defines Binding of OpenID Connect ID Tokens
- Refinements to phase-in logic about to occur
- Implementation available for interop testing
  - Created by Brian Campbell
  - See <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg01332.html">https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg01332.html</a>



- "phr" Phishing-Resistant
  - An authentication mechanism where a party potentially under the control of the Relying Party cannot gain sufficient information to be able to successfully authenticate to the End User's OpenID Provider as if that party were the End User.
- "phrh" Phishing-Resistant Hardware Protected
  - An authentication mechanism meeting the requirements for phishing-resistant authentication above in which additionally information needed to be able to successfully authenticate to the End User's OpenID Provider as if that party were the End User is held in a hardware-protected device or component.
- Phishing-Resistant definition based on 2008 OpenID Provider Authentication Policy Extension (PAPE) spec



#### Status

- Working group active
  - Chairs Mike Jones and Brian Campbell
- Calls scheduled every two weeks on Thursdays
- For more info see the working group page
  - <a href="http://openid.net/wg/eap/">http://openid.net/wg/eap/</a>