{"id":73,"date":"2008-05-26T02:58:50","date_gmt":"2008-05-26T09:58:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/?p=73"},"modified":"2008-05-26T02:58:50","modified_gmt":"2008-05-26T09:58:50","slug":"gone-phishing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/?p=73","title":{"rendered":"Gone Phishing"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.fun.de\/\">Fun Communications<\/a>&#8216; site <a href=\"http:\/\/idtheft.fun.de\/\">idtheft.fun.de<\/a> lets you mount your very own man-in-the-middle based phishing attack against the OpenID provider of your choosing.  Rather than redirecting you to the OpenID provider you specify, it instead redirects you to a page impersonating the OpenID provider, created using content scraped from the real site behind the scenes.<\/p>\n<p>This is the same kind of attack shown in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/?p=923\">Kim&#8217;s phishing video<\/a>.  <a href=\"http:\/\/idtheft.fun.de\/\">idtheft.fun.de<\/a> lets you have the fun of doing it yourself!<\/p>\n<p>I tried it myself with several OpenID providers I use.  Predictably, I was typically able to &#8220;steal&#8221; the passwords for OpenIDs when logging into them with passwords and hijack the resulting logged-in sessions.  &#8220;Protecting&#8221; an account with a one-time-password (OTP) device did nothing to stop this; my &#8220;attack&#8221; still succeeded in hijacking the session established using a password in combination with an OTP value.<\/p>\n<p>Two things did defeat these attacks.  Because Information Cards generate site-specific sign-in information and the attacker&#8217;s site is different than the authentic site, even when I was &#8220;tricked&#8221; into submitting an Information Card to the imposter site, it didn&#8217;t give the imposter the ability to log into the real site.  No shared secret was present to steal and no session was established to hijack.<\/p>\n<p>The other thing that defeated this specific attack was the use of JavaScript in the sign-in process by the OpenID provider.  While a slightly more sophisticated attack could almost certainly get past this obstacle, idtheft.fun.de apparently doesn&#8217;t correctly mimic JavaScript site features like &#8220;Sign In&#8221; buttons invoking an onclick method.<\/p>\n<p>This ability to both phish passwords and hijack the resulting logged-in sessions is exactly why I and others are working on finishing the OpenID <a href=\"http:\/\/openid.net\/specs\/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0-02.html\">Provider Authentication Policy Extension (PAPE)<\/a> extension.  As <a href=\"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/?p=15\">I wrote<\/a> when the first draft was published, PAPE enables &#8220;OpenID relying parties to request that a phishing-resistant authentication method be used by the OpenID provider and for providers to inform relying parties whether a phishing-resistant authentication method, such as Windows CardSpace, was used.&#8221;  It&#8217;s time for PAPE to become an OpenID standard.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>What follows are screen shots from a successful phishing attack and a thwarted one &#8212; both against the same OP.  The difference is whether passwords or Information Cards were used to log in.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"plain\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/images\/idtheft.start.png\" alt=\"Figure 1: idtheft start\" \/><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Figure 1:<\/strong>  About to mount my attack against my OpenID at myopenid.com.  I&#8217;ve typed the URL of my OpenID into the relying party.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"plain\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/images\/idtheft.signin.png\" alt=\"Figure 2: idtheft signin\" \/><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Figure 2:<\/strong>  Next, I&#8217;m logging in with a password.  An observant user could notice several things wrong:   the address bar shows the imposter&#8217;s URL, the imposter&#8217;s URL is present in the &#8220;You must sign in to authenticate to &#8230;&#8221; message, and the &#8220;Your Personal Icon&#8221; space is blank.  Unfortunately, there is <a href=\"http:\/\/usablesecurity.org\/emperor\/\">strong evidence that users are not observant<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"plain\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/images\/idtheft.allow.png\" alt=\"Figure 3: idtheft allow\" \/><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Figure 3:<\/strong>  Phishing already accomplished.  Same cues are present that something&#8217;s amiss.  Of course, a more sophisticated attack could replace the imposter&#8217;s URL in the page with the &#8220;real one&#8221; in both of these screens, eliminating the most obvious cue.  I scroll down and click &#8220;Allow Once&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"plain\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/images\/idtheft.accomplished.png\" alt=\"Figure 4: idtheft accomplished\" \/><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Figure 4:<\/strong>  Result after being redirected back to the &#8220;relying party&#8221;.  Yes, that was my real password.<\/p>\n<p>Next, I tried to attack my account again but was surprised that I wasn&#8217;t asked to log in this time.  Of course &#8212; the attacker&#8217;s session was already logged in!  So I signed out as the man-in-the-middle (that was weird), enabling me to try again. <\/p>\n<p>My next steps looked just like Figures 1 and 2, except instead of typing a password I clicked the purple Information Card button.  This brought me to:<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"plain\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/images\/idtheft.cardspace.png\" alt=\"Figure 5: idtheft cardspace\" \/><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Figure 5:<\/strong>  CardSpace informs me that I&#8217;ve never sent a card to this site before.  An observant user would realize that they don&#8217;t normally see this screen and might decline.  But then, we&#8217;ve already discussed how observant users aren&#8217;t.  I click &#8220;Yes&#8221;, choose the card I normally use to log into myopenid.com, and send it.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"plain\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/images\/idtheft.prevented.png\" alt=\"Figure 6: idtheft prevented\" \/><\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Figure 6:<\/strong>  Phishing prevented.  &#8220;Error processing Information Card token&#8221; isn&#8217;t the most informative error message I&#8217;ve ever seen but behind it is great news:  the phishing attack failed because the token constructed for the imposter site wasn&#8217;t usable at the real site.<\/p>\n<p>And thanks to <a href=\"http:\/\/idtheft.fun.de\/\">idtheft.fun.de<\/a>, you <strong><em>can<\/em><\/strong> try this at home!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Fun Communications&#8216; site idtheft.fun.de lets you mount your very own man-in-the-middle based phishing attack against the OpenID provider of your choosing. Rather than redirecting you to the OpenID provider you specify, it instead redirects you to a page impersonating the OpenID provider, created using content scraped from the real site behind the scenes. This is [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,14,19,6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-73","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-information-cards","category-openid","category-phishing-resistance","category-windows-cardspace"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=73"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=73"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=73"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/self-issued.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=73"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}