| Network Working Group | A. Backman, Ed. |
| Internet-Draft | Amazon |
| Intended status: Standards Track | M. Jones, Ed. |
| Expires: September 11, 2019 | Microsoft |
| M. Scurtescu | |
| Coinbase | |
| M. Ansari | |
| Cisco | |
| A. Nadalin | |
| Microsoft | |
| March 10, 2019 |
Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-02
This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens (SETs) may be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's need for assurance.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2019.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens (SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to poll for SETs using HTTP POST.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Throughout this document, all figures MAY contain spaces and extra line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations.
This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417], as well as the terms defined below:
When an event occurs, the SET Transmitter constructs a SET [RFC8417] that describes the event. The SET Transmitter determines the SET Recipients that the SET should be distributed to.
How SETs are defined and the process by which events are identified for SET Recipients is out of scope of this specification.
When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter attempts to deliver the SET by queueing s the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs using HTTP/1.1 POST.
In Poll-Based SET Delivery Using HTTP, zero or more SETs are delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a Content-Type of application/json, as described in Section 2.1.
After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are not be required to retain or record SETs for recovery. Once a SET is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for retention and recovery.
Transmitted SETs SHOULD be self-validating (e.g., signed) if there is a requirement to verify they were issued by the SET Transmitter at a later date when de-coupled from the original delivery where authenticity could be checked via the HTTP or TLS mutual authentication.
Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates it. The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge receipt to the SET Transmitter.
The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the event acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than relating to the parsing and validation of the SET.
This method allows a SET Recipient to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 of [RFC7231]) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short polling) or requests MAY wait, pending availability of new SETs using long polling, per Section 2 of [RFC6202].
The delivery of SETs in this method is facilitated by HTTP POST requests initiated by the SET Recipient in which:
The purpose of the acknowledgement is to inform the SET Transmitter that delivery has succeeded and redelivery is no longer required. Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients SHOULD ensure that received SETs have been validated and retained in a manner appropriate to the recipient's requirements. The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Recipients is out of scope of this specification.
When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON document that consists of polling request parameters and SET acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON attributes. The request payloads are delivered in a JSON document, as described in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5.
When making a request, the HTTP header Content-Type is set to application/json.
The following JSON attributes are used in a polling request:
In response to a poll request, the SET Transmitter checks for available SETs and responds with a JSON document containing the following JSON attributes:
When making a response, the HTTP header Content-Type is set to application/json.
The SET Recipient performs an HTTP POST (see Section 4.3.4 of [RFC7231]) to a pre-arranged polling endpoint URI to check for SETs that are available. Because the SET Recipient has no prior SETs to acknowledge, the ack and errs request parameters are omitted.
If after a period of time, negotiated between the SET Transmitter and Recipient, a SET Transmitter MAY redeliver SETs it has previously delivered. The SET Recipient SHOULD accept repeat SETs and acknowledge the SETs regardless of whether the Recipient believes it has already acknowledged the SETs previously. A SET Transmitter MAY limit the number of times it attempts to deliver a SET.
If the SET Recipient has received SETs from the SET Transmitter, the SET Recipient SHOULD parse and validate received SETs to meet its own requirements and SHOULD acknowledge receipt in a timely fashion (e.g., seconds or minutes) so that the SET Transmitter can mark the SETs as received. SET Recipients SHOULD acknowledge receipt before taking any local actions based on the SETs to avoid unnecessary delay in acknowledgement, where possible.
Poll requests have three variations:
In the case where no SETs were received in a previous poll (see Figure 7), the SET Recipient simply polls without acknowledgement parameters (sets and setErrs).
The following is an example request made by a SET Recipient that has no outstanding SETs to acknowledge and is polling for available SETs.
The following is a non-normative example poll request to the endpoint: https://nofity.exampleidp.com/Events.
POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.exampleidp.com
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
Accept: application/json
{
"returnImmediately": true
}
Figure 1: Example Initial Poll Request
A SET Recipient can poll using default parameter values by passing an empty JSON object.
The following is a non-normative example default poll request to the endpoint: https://nofity.exampleidp.com/Events.
POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.exampleidp.com
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
Accept: application/json
{}
Figure 2: Example Default Poll Request
In this variation, the SET Recipient acknowledges previously received SETs and indicates it does not want to receive SETs in response by setting the maxEvents attribute to 0.
This variation might be used, for instance, when a SET Recipient needs to acknowledge received SETs independently (e.g., on separate threads) from the process of receiving SETs.
The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of SETs received (for example as shown in Figure 6).
POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.exampleidp.com
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
{
"ack": [
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"
],
"maxEvents": 0,
"returnImmediately": true
}
Figure 3: Example Acknowledge Only Request
This variation allows a recipient thread to simultaneously acknowledge previously received SETs and wait for the next group of SETs in a single request.
The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of SETs received in Figure 6.
POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.exampleidp.com
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
{
"ack": [
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"
],
"returnImmediately": false
}
Figure 4: Example Poll with Acknowledgement and No Errors
In the above acknowledgement, the SET Recipient has acknowledged receipt of two SETs and has indicated it wants to wait until the next SET is available.
In the case where errors were detected in previously delivered SETs, the SET Recipient MAY use the setErrs attribute to communicate the errors in the following poll request.
The following is a non-normative example of a response acknowledging one successfully received SET and one SET with an error from the two SETs received in in Figure 6.
POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.exampleidp.com
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
{
"ack": ["3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"],
"setErrs": {
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": {
"err": "jwtAud",
"description": "The audience value was invalid."
}
},
"returnImmediately": true
}
Figure 5: Example Poll Acknowledgement with Error
In response to a poll request, the service provider MAY respond immediately if SETs are available to be delivered. If no SETs are available at the time of the request, the SET Transmitter SHALL delay responding until a SET is available or the timeout interval has elapsed unless the poll request parameter returnImmediately is true.
As described in Section 2.3, a JSON document is returned containing a number of attributes including sets which SHALL contain zero or more SETs.
The following is a non-normative example response to the request shown Section 2.4. This example shows two SETs are returned.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Location: https://notify.exampleidp/Events
{
"sets": {
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8":
"eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.
eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdCI6MTQ
1ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbIm
h0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M
2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIx
ZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV
2ZW50OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcn
MvNDRmNjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuY
W1lIiwidXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19.",
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30":
"eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.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."
}
}
Figure 6: Example Poll Response
In the above example, a two SETs whose jti are 4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8 and 3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30 are delivered.
The following is a non-normative example response to the request shown Section 2.4 showing no new SETs or unacknowledged SETs are available.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Location: https://notify.exampleidp/Events
{
"sets": {}
}
Figure 7: Example No SETs Poll Response
Upon receiving the JSON document (e.g., as shown in Figure 6), the SET Recipient parses and verifies the received SETs and notifies the SET Transmitter via the next poll request to the SET Transmitter, as described in Section 2.4.3 or Section 2.4.4.
If a SET is invalid, error codes from the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes" registry established by [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push] are used in error responses. An error response SHALL include a JSON object that provides details about the error. The JSON object includes the JSON attributes:
When included as part of a batch of SETs, the above JSON is included as part of the setErrs attribute, as defined in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4.4.
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon HTTP and depends on the use of TLS and/or standard HTTP authentication and authorization schemes as per [RFC7235]. For example, the following methodologies could be used among others:
As per Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate supported HTTP authentication schemes via the WWW-Authenticate header.
Because SET Delivery describes a simple function, authorization for the ability to pick-up or deliver SETs can be derived by considering the identity of the SET issuer, or via an authentication method above. This specification considers authentication as a feature to prevent denial-of-service attacks. Because SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest after acknowledging their receipt.
For illustrative purposes only, SET delivery examples show an OAuth2 bearer token value [RFC6750] in the authorization header. This is not intended to imply that bearer tokens are preferred. However, the use of bearer tokens in the specification does reflect common practice.
When using bearer tokens or proof-of-possession tokens that represent an authorization grant such as issued by OAuth (see [RFC6749]), implementers SHOULD consider the type of authorization granted, any authorized scopes (see Section 3.3 of [RFC6749]), and the security subject(s) that SHOULD be mapped from the authorization when considering local access control rules. Section 6 of the OAuth Assertions draft [RFC7521], documents common scenarios for authorization including:[RFC7521]). When using other token formats or frameworks, implementers MUST take into account similar threats and countermeasures, especially those documented by the relevant specifications.
When using OAuth access tokens, implementers MUST take into account the threats and countermeasures documented in the security considerations for the use of client authorizations (see Section 8 of
In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used (see [RFC7515] and Security Considerations). This enables the SET Recipient to validate that the SET issuer is authorized to deliver the SET.
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of [RFC7230] and its related specifications.
As stated in Section 2.7.1 of [RFC7230], an HTTP requestor MUST NOT generate the userinfo (i.e., username and password) component (and its "@" delimiter) when an "http" URI reference is generated with a message as they are now disallowed in HTTP.
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered PII (e.g., subject claims). In such cases, SET Transmitters and SET Recipients MUST encrypt the SET, either with a transport-layer security mechanism, with JWE [RFC7516], or both. Event delivery endpoints MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
When using access tokens such as those issued by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account threats and countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521].
Due to the possibility of interception, Bearer tokens MUST be exchanged using TLS.
Bearer tokens MUST have a limited lifetime that can be determined directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service) by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth2, a client MAY use an OAuth refresh token to obtain a new bearer token after authenticating to an authorization server, per Section 6 of [RFC6749].
Implementations supporting OAuth bearer tokens need to factor in security considerations of this authorization method [RFC7521]. Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP BASIC, are well documented in [RFC7617], therefore implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger authentication methods. Designating the specific methods of authentication and authorization are out of scope for the delivery of SETs, however this information is provided as a resource to implementers.
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, a JWS signature MAY be used to provide verification of its authenticity.
SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally identifiable information. Where possible, SET Transmitters and Recipients SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation, for example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to already know the subject.
There are no IANA considerations.
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015.
The editors would like to thank Phil Hunt and the other the authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, on which this draft is based.
The editors would like to thank the participants in the SecEvents working group for their contributions to this specification.
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the following additions:
Draft 01 - mbj:
Draft 02 - mbj: