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The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications.
This InternetDraft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
InternetDrafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as InternetDrafts. The list of current InternetDrafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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This InternetDraft will expire on October 25, 2013.
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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1.
Introduction
1.1.
Notational Conventions
2.
Terminology
2.1.
Terms Incorporated from the JWS Specification
2.2.
Terms Incorporated from the JWE Specification
2.3.
Terms Incorporated from the JWK Specification
2.4.
Defined Terms
3.
Cryptographic Algorithms for JWS
3.1.
"alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS
3.2.
MAC with HMAC SHA256, HMAC SHA384, or HMAC SHA512
3.3.
Digital Signature with RSA SHA256, RSA SHA384, or RSA SHA512
3.4.
Digital Signature with ECDSA P256 SHA256, ECDSA P384 SHA384, or ECDSA P521 SHA512
3.5.
Using the Algorithm "none"
3.6.
Additional Digital Signature/MAC Algorithms and Parameters
4.
Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE
4.1.
"alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE
4.2.
"enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter Values for JWE
4.3.
Key Encryption with RSAESPKCS1V1_5
4.4.
Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP
4.5.
Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap
4.6.
Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key
4.7.
Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static (ECDHES)
4.7.1.
Key Derivation for "ECDHES"
4.8.
AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms
4.8.1.
Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2
4.8.2.
Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm
4.8.2.1.
AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption
4.8.2.2.
AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption
4.8.3.
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
4.8.4.
AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512
4.8.5.
Plaintext Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2
4.9.
Plaintext Encryption with AES GCM
4.10.
Additional Encryption Algorithms and Parameters
5.
Cryptographic Algorithms for JWK
5.1.
"kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values for JWK
5.2.
JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys
5.2.1.
JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys
5.2.1.1.
"crv" (Curve) Parameter
5.2.1.2.
"x" (X Coordinate) Parameter
5.2.1.3.
"y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter
5.2.2.
JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys
5.2.2.1.
"d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter
5.3.
JWK Parameters for RSA Keys
5.3.1.
JWK Parameters for RSA Public Keys
5.3.1.1.
"n" (Modulus) Parameter
5.3.1.2.
"e" (Exponent) Parameter
5.3.2.
JWK Parameters for RSA Private Keys
5.3.2.1.
"d" (Private Exponent) Parameter
5.3.2.2.
"p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter
5.3.2.3.
"q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter
5.3.2.4.
"dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter
5.3.2.5.
"dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter
5.3.2.6.
"qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter
5.3.2.7.
"oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter
5.3.3.
JWK Parameters for Symmetric Keys
5.3.3.1.
"k" (Key Value) Parameter
5.4.
Additional Key Types and Parameters
6.
IANA Considerations
6.1.
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry
6.1.1.
Template
6.1.2.
Initial Registry Contents
6.2.
JSON Web Key Types Registry
6.2.1.
Registration Template
6.2.2.
Initial Registry Contents
6.3.
JSON Web Key Parameters Registration
6.3.1.
Registry Contents
7.
Security Considerations
8.
References
8.1.
Normative References
8.2.
Informative References
Appendix A.
Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier CrossReference
Appendix B.
Encryption Algorithm Identifier CrossReference
Appendix C.
Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms
C.1.
Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
C.2.
Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512
Appendix D.
Acknowledgements
Appendix E.
Document History
§
Author's Address
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The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.), JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” April 2013.), and JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” April 2013.) specifications. All these specifications utilize JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] (Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” July 2006.) based data structures. This specification also describes the semantics and operations that are specific to these algorithms and key types.
Enumerating the algorithms and identifiers for them in this specification, rather than in the JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications, is intended to allow them to remain unchanged in the face of changes in the set of required, recommended, optional, and deprecated algorithms over time.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).
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These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.) specification are incorporated into this specification:
 JSON Web Signature (JWS)
 A data structure representing a digitally signed or MACed message. The structure represents three values: the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature.
 JSON Text Object
 A UTF8 [RFC3629] (Yergeau, F., “UTF8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” November 2003.) encoded text string representing a JSON object; the syntax of JSON objects is defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC4627] (Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” July 2006.).
 JWS Header
 A JSON Text Object that describes the digital signature or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value.
 JWS Payload
 The sequence of octets to be secured  a.k.a., the message. The payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets.
 JWS Signature
 A sequence of octets containing the cryptographic material that ensures the integrity of the JWS Header and the JWS Payload. The JWS Signature value is a digital signature or MAC value calculated over the JWS Signing Input using the parameters specified in the JWS Header.
 Base64url Encoding
 The URL and filenamesafe Base64 encoding described in RFC 4648 (Josefsson, S., “The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings,” October 2006.) [RFC4648], Section 5, with the (non URLsafe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2. (See Appendix C of [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.) for notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding.)
 Encoded JWS Header
 Base64url encoding of the JWS Header.
 Encoded JWS Payload
 Base64url encoding of the JWS Payload.
 Encoded JWS Signature
 Base64url encoding of the JWS Signature.
 JWS Signing Input
 The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload.
 Collision Resistant Namespace
 A namespace that allows names to be allocated in a manner such that they are highly unlikely to collide with other names. For instance, collision resistance can be achieved through administrative delegation of portions of the namespace or through use of collisionresistant name allocation functions. Examples of Collision Resistant Namespaces include: Domain Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITUT X.660 and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUIDs) [RFC4122] (Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, “A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace,” July 2005.). When using an administratively delegated namespace, the definer of a name needs to take reasonable precautions to ensure they are in control of the portion of the namespace they use to define the name.
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These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” April 2013.) specification are incorporated into this specification:
 JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
 A data structure representing an encrypted message. The structure represents five values: the JWE Header, the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag.
 Authenticated Encryption
 An Authenticated Encryption algorithm is one that provides an integrated content integrity check. Authenticated Encryption algorithms accept two inputs, the Plaintext and the Additional Authenticated Data value, and produce two outputs, the Ciphertext and the Authentication Tag value. AES Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is one such algorithm.
 Plaintext
 The sequence of octets to be encrypted  a.k.a., the message. The plaintext can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets.
 Ciphertext
 An encrypted representation of the Plaintext.
 Additional Associated Data (AAD)
 An input to an Authenticated Encryption operation that is integrity protected but not encrypted.
 Authentication Tag
 An output of an Authenticated Encryption operation that ensures the integrity of the Ciphertext and the Additional Associated Data.
 Content Encryption Key (CEK)
 A symmetric key for the Authenticated Encryption algorithm used to encrypt the Plaintext for the recipient to produce the Ciphertext and the Authentication Tag.
 JWE Header
 A JSON Text Object that describes the encryption operations applied to create the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag.
 JWE Encrypted Key
 The result of encrypting the Content Encryption Key (CEK) with the intended recipient's key using the specified algorithm. Note that for some algorithms, the JWE Encrypted Key value is specified as being the empty octet sequence.
 JWE Initialization Vector
 A sequence of octets containing the Initialization Vector used when encrypting the Plaintext.
 JWE Ciphertext
 A sequence of octets containing the Ciphertext for a JWE.
 JWE Authentication Tag
 A sequence of octets containing the Authentication Tag for a JWE.
 Encoded JWE Header
 Base64url encoding of the JWE Header.
 Encoded JWE Encrypted Key
 Base64url encoding of the JWE Encrypted Key.
 Encoded JWE Initialization Vector
 Base64url encoding of the JWE Initialization Vector.
 Encoded JWE Ciphertext
 Base64url encoding of the JWE Ciphertext.
 Encoded JWE Authentication Tag
 Base64url encoding of the JWE Authentication Tag.
 Key Management Mode
 A method of determining the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value to use. Each algorithm used for determining the CEK value uses a specific Key Management Mode. Key Management Modes employed by this specification are Key Encryption, Key Wrapping, Direct Key Agreement, Key Agreement with Key Wrapping, and Direct Encryption.
 Key Encryption
 A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value is encrypted to the intended recipient using an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
 Key Wrapping
 A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value is encrypted to the intended recipient using a symmetric key wrapping algorithm.
 Direct Key Agreement
 A Key Management Mode in which a key agreement algorithm is used to agree upon the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value.
 Key Agreement with Key Wrapping
 A Key Management Mode in which a key agreement algorithm is used to agree upon a symmetric key used to encrypt the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value to the intended recipient using a symmetric key wrapping algorithm.
 Direct Encryption
 A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value used is the secret symmetric key value shared between the parties.
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These terms defined by the JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” April 2013.) specification are incorporated into this specification:
 JSON Web Key (JWK)
 A JSON object that represents a cryptographic key.
 JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set)
 A JSON object that contains an array of JWKs as the value of its keys member.
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These terms are defined for use by this specification:
 Header Parameter Name
 The name of a member of the JSON object representing a JWS Header or JWE Header.
 Header Parameter Value
 The value of a member of the JSON object representing a JWS Header or JWE Header.
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JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or create a Message Authentication Codes (MAC) of the contents of the JWS Header and the JWS Payload. The use of the following algorithms for producing JWSs is defined in this section.
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The table below is the set of alg (algorithm) header parameter values defined by this specification for use with JWS, each of which is explained in more detail in the following sections:
alg Parameter Value  Digital Signature or MAC Algorithm  Implementation Requirements 

HS256  HMAC using SHA256 hash algorithm  REQUIRED 
HS384  HMAC using SHA384 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
HS512  HMAC using SHA512 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
RS256  RSASSA using SHA256 hash algorithm  RECOMMENDED 
RS384  RSASSA using SHA384 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
RS512  RSASSA using SHA512 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
ES256  ECDSA using P256 curve and SHA256 hash algorithm  RECOMMENDED+ 
ES384  ECDSA using P384 curve and SHA384 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
ES512  ECDSA using P521 curve and SHA512 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
none  No digital signature or MAC value included  REQUIRED 
All the names are short because a core goal of JWS is for the representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length restriction on alg values.
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.
See Appendix A (Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier CrossReference) for a table crossreferencing the digital signature and MAC alg (algorithm) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.
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Hashbased Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that the MAC matches the hashed content, in this case the JWS Signing Input, which therefore demonstrates that whoever generated the MAC was in possession of the secret. The means of exchanging the shared key is outside the scope of this specification.
The algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in RFC 2104 (Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, “HMAC: KeyedHashing for Message Authentication,” February 1997.) [RFC2104]. This section defines the use of the HMAC SHA256, HMAC SHA384, and HMAC SHA512 functions [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.). The alg (algorithm) header parameter values HS256, HS384, and HS512 are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded HMAC value using the respective hash function.
A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for HS256) or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
The HMAC SHA256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the octets of the ASCII [USASCII] (American National Standards Institute, “Coded Character Set  7bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange,” 1986.) representation of the JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS Signature. The JWS signature is base64url encoded to produce the Encoded JWS Signature.
The HMAC SHA256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC value per RFC 2104, using SHA256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the octets of the ASCII representation of the received JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. This computed HMAC value is then compared to the result of base64url decoding the received Encoded JWS signature. Alternatively, the computed HMAC value can be base64url encoded and compared to the received Encoded JWS Signature, as this comparison produces the same result as comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match, the HMAC has been validated. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
Securing content with the HMAC SHA384 and HMAC SHA512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA256  just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger minimum key sizes and result values: 384 bits each for HMAC SHA384 and 512 bits each for HMAC SHA512.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.).
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This section defines the use of the RSASSAPKCS1V1_5 digital signature algorithm as defined in Section 8.2 of RFC 3447 (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.) [RFC3447], (commonly known as PKCS #1), using SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512 [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.) as the hash functions. The alg (algorithm) header parameter values RS256, RS384, and RS512 are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded RSA digital signature using the respective hash function.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms.
The RSA SHA256 digital signature is generated as follows:
The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for that JWS.
The RSA SHA256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:
Signing with the RSA SHA384 and RSA SHA512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for RSA SHA256  just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger result values: 384 bits for RSA SHA384 and 512 bits for RSA SHA512.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.).
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The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.) provides for the use of Elliptic Curve cryptography, which is able to provide equivalent security to RSA cryptography but using shorter key sizes and with greater processing speed. This means that ECDSA digital signatures will be substantially smaller in terms of length than equivalently strong RSA digital signatures.
This specification defines the use of ECDSA with the P256 curve and the SHA256 cryptographic hash function, ECDSA with the P384 curve and the SHA384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P521 curve and the SHA512 hash function. The P256, P384, and P521 curves are defined in [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.). The alg (algorithm) header parameter values ES256, ES384, and ES512 are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded ECDSA P256 SHA256, ECDSA P384 SHA384, or ECDSA P521 SHA512 digital signature, respectively.
The ECDSA P256 SHA256 digital signature is generated as follows:
The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for the JWS.
The ECDSA P256 SHA256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:
Note that ECDSA digital signature contains a value referred to as K, which is a random number generated for each digital signature instance. This means that two ECDSA digital signatures using exactly the same input parameters will output different signature values because their K values will be different. A consequence of this is that one cannot validate an ECDSA signature by recomputing the signature and comparing the results.
Signing with the ECDSA P384 SHA384 and ECDSA P521 SHA512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P256 SHA256  just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P384 SHA384, R and S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96 octet sequence. For ECDSA P521 SHA512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a 132 octet sequence.
Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4 of [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.).
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JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection. Such a JWS is called a "Plaintext JWS". Plaintext JWSs MUST use the alg value none, and are formatted identically to other JWSs, but with the empty string for its JWS Signature value.
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Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWSs with corresponding alg (algorithm) header parameter values being defined to refer to them. New alg header parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry Section 6.1 (JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry) or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In particular, it is permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML DSIG (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, “(Extensible Markup Language) XMLSignature Syntax and Processing,” March 2002.) [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Yiu, K., Solo, D., Datta, P., Hirsch, F., Cantor, S., and T. Roessler, “XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0,” January 2012.) [W3C.CR‑xmldsig‑core2‑20120124], and related specifications as alg values.
As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common alg value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be distinct, as the alg value can be used to determine whether the object is a JWS or JWE.
Likewise, additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.). As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the specifications.
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JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt the Content Encryption Key (CEK) and the Plaintext. This section specifies a set of specific algorithms for these purposes.
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The table below is the set of alg (algorithm) header parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the CEK, producing the JWE Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CEK.
alg Parameter Value  Key Management Algorithm  Implementation Requirements 

RSA1_5  RSAESPKCS1V1_5 [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.)  REQUIRED 
RSAOAEP  RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.), with the default parameters specified by RFC 3447 in Section A.2.1  OPTIONAL 
A128KW  Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] (Schaad, J. and R. Housley, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm,” September 2002.) using the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 and using 128 bit keys  RECOMMENDED 
A256KW  AES Key Wrap Algorithm using the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 and using 256 bit keys  RECOMMENDED 
dir  Direct use of a shared symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the block encryption step (rather than using the symmetric key to wrap the CEK)  RECOMMENDED 
ECDHES  Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090] (McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, “Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms,” February 2011.) key agreement using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.), with the agreedupon key being used directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) (rather than being used to wrap the CEK), as specified in Section 4.7 (Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static (ECDHES))  RECOMMENDED+ 
ECDHES+A128KW  Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static key agreement per ECDHES and Section 4.7 (Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static (ECDHES)), but where the agreedupon key is used to wrap the Content Encryption Key (CEK) with the A128KW function (rather than being used directly as the CEK)  RECOMMENDED 
ECDHES+A256KW  Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static key agreement per ECDHES and Section 4.7 (Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static (ECDHES)), but where the agreedupon key is used to wrap the Content Encryption Key (CEK) with the A256KW function (rather than being used directly as the CEK)  RECOMMENDED 
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.
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The table below is the set of enc (encryption method) header parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the Plaintext, which produces the Ciphertext.
enc Parameter Value  Block Encryption Algorithm  Implementation Requirements 

A128CBCHS256  The AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 4.8.3 (AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256). This algorithm uses a 256 bit key.  REQUIRED 
A256CBCHS512  The AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm, as defined in Section 4.8.4 (AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512). This algorithm uses a 512 bit key.  REQUIRED 
A128GCM  AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.) [NIST.800‑38D] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC,” December 2001.) using 128 bit keys  RECOMMENDED 
A256GCM  AES GCM using 256 bit keys  RECOMMENDED 
All the names are short because a core goal of JWE is for the representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length restriction on alg values.
See Appendix B (Encryption Algorithm Identifier CrossReference) for a table crossreferencing the encryption alg (algorithm) and enc (encryption method) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.
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This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAESPKCS1V1_5 [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.). The alg header parameter value RSA1_5 is used in this case.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” April 2013.).
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This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.), with the default parameters specified by RFC 3447 in Section A.2.1. The alg header parameter value RSAOAEP is used in this case.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” April 2013.).
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This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] (Schaad, J. and R. Housley, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm,” September 2002.) using the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 using 128 or 256 bit keys. The alg header parameter values A128KW or A256KW are used in this case.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.3 of [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” April 2013.).
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This section defines the specifics of directly performing symmetric key encryption without performing a key wrapping step. In this case, the shared symmetric key is used directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value for the enc algorithm. An empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The alg header parameter value dir is used in this case.
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This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090] (McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, “Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms,” February 2011.), and using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.). The key agreement result can be used in one of two ways:
The alg header parameter value ECDHES is used in the Direct Key Agreement mode and the values ECDHES+A128KW and ECDHES+A256KW are used in the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode.
In the Direct Key Agreement case, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the same length as that used by the enc algorithm; in this case, the empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. In the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping case, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the length needed for the specified key wrapping algorithm, either 128 or 256 bits respectively.
A new epk (ephemeral public key) value MUST be generated for each key agreement transaction.
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The key derivation process derives the agreed upon key from the shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per Section 6.2.2.2 of [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.).
Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.), where the Digest Method is SHA256. The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows:
 Z
 This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as an octet sequence.
 keydatalen
 This is set to the number of bits in the desired output key. For ECDHES, this is length of the key used by the enc algorithm. For ECDHES+A128KW, and ECDHES+A256KW, this is 128 and 256, respectively.
 AlgorithmID
 This is set to the concatenation of keydatalen represented as a 32 bit big endian integer and the octets of the UTF8 representation of the alg header parameter value.
 PartyUInfo
 The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen  Data, where Data is a variablelength string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixedlength, big endian 32 bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data, with  being concatenation. If an apu (agreement PartyUInfo) header parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url decoding the apu value and Datalen is set to the number of octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the empty octet sequence.
 PartyVInfo
 The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen  Data, where Data is a variablelength string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixedlength, big endian 32 bit counter that indicates the length (in octets) of Data, with  being concatenation. If an apv (agreement PartyVInfo) header parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url decoding the apv value and Datalen is set to the number of octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the empty octet sequence.
 SuppPubInfo
 This is set to the empty octet sequence.
 SuppPrivInfo
 This is set to the empty octet sequence.
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This section defines a family of authenticated encryption algorithms built using a composition of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.) [NIST.800‑38A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,” December 2001.) operations and HMAC [RFC2104] (Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, “HMAC: KeyedHashing for Message Authentication,” February 1997.) [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.) operations. This algorithm family is called AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2. It also defines two instances of this family, one using 128 bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA256 and the other using 256 bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA512. Test cases for these algorithms can be found in Appendix C (Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms).
These algorithms are based upon Authenticated Encryption with AESCBC and HMACSHA (McGrew, D. and K. Paterson, “Authenticated Encryption with AESCBC and HMACSHA,” October 2012.) [I‑D.mcgrew‑aead‑aes‑cbc‑hmac‑sha2], performing the same cryptographic computations, but with the Initialization Vector and Authentication Tag values remaining separate, rather than being concatenated with the Ciphertext value in the output representation. This algorithm family is a generalization of the algorithm family in [I‑D.mcgrew‑aead‑aes‑cbc‑hmac‑sha2] (McGrew, D. and K. Paterson, “Authenticated Encryption with AESCBC and HMACSHA,” October 2012.), and can be used to implement those algorithms.
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We use the following notational conventions.
CBCPKCS5ENC(X,P) denotes the AES CBC encryption of P using PKCS #5 padding using the cipher with the key X.
MAC(Y, M) denotes the application of the Message Authentication Code (MAC) to the message M, using the key Y.
The concatenation of two octet strings A and B is denoted as A  B.
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This section defines AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 in a manner that is independent of the AES CBC key size or hash function to be used. Section 4.8.2.1 (AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption) and Section 4.8.2.2 (AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption) define the generic encryption and decryption algorithms. Section 4.8.3 (AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256) and Section 4.8.4 (AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512) define instances of AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 that specify those details.
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The authenticated encryption algorithm takes as input four octet strings: a secret key K, a plaintext P, associated data A, and an initialization vector IV. The authenticated ciphertext value E and the authentication tag value T are provided as outputs. The data in the plaintext are encrypted and authenticated, and the associated data are authenticated, but not encrypted.
The encryption process is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps:
Here we denote the number of octets in the MAC_KEY as MAC_KEY_LEN, and the number of octets in ENC_KEY as ENC_KEY_LEN; the values of these parameters are specified by the AEAD algorithms (in Section 4.8.3 (AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256) and Section 4.8.4 (AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512)). The number of octets in the input key K is the sum of MAC_KEY_LEN and ENC_KEY_LEN. When generating the secondary keys from K, MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY MUST NOT overlap. Note that the MAC key comes before the encryption key in the input key K; this is in the opposite order of the algorithm names in the identifier "AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2".MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in order.
ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in order.
The string MAC_KEY is used as the MAC key. We denote the output of the MAC computed in this step as M. The first T_LEN bits of M are used as T.the associated data A,
the initialization vector IV,
the ciphertext E computed in the previous step, and
the octet string AL defined above.
The encryption process can be illustrated as follows. Here K, P, A, IV, and E denote the key, plaintext, associated data, initialization vector, and ciphertext, respectively.
MAC_KEY = initial MAC_KEY_LEN bytes of K,
ENC_KEY = final ENC_KEY_LEN bytes of K,
E = CBCPKCS5ENC(ENC_KEY, P),
M = MAC(MAC_KEY, A  IV  E  AL),
T = initial T_LEN bytes of M.
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The authenticated decryption operation has four inputs: K, A, E, and T as defined above. It has only a single output, either a plaintext value P or a special symbol FAIL that indicates that the inputs are not authentic. The authenticated decryption algorithm is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of steps:
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This algorithm is a concrete instantiation of the generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithm above. It uses the HMAC message authentication code [RFC2104] (Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, “HMAC: KeyedHashing for Message Authentication,” February 1997.) with the SHA256 hash function [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.) to provide message authentication, with the HMAC output truncated to 128 bits, corresponding to the HMACSHA256128 algorithm defined in [RFC4868] (Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, “Using HMACSHA256, HMACSHA384, and HMACSHA512 with IPsec,” May 2007.). For encryption, it uses AES in the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of operation as defined in Section 6.2 of [NIST.800‑38A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,” December 2001.), with PKCS #5 padding.
The input key K is 32 octets long.
The AES CBC IV is 16 octets long. ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
The SHA256 hash algorithm is used in HMAC. MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets. The HMACSHA256 output is truncated to T_LEN=16 octets, by stripping off the final 16 octets.
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AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but with the following differences:
A 256 bit AES CBC key is used instead of 128.
SHA512 is used in HMAC instead of SHA256.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
The length of the input key K is 64 octets.
The HMAC SHA512 value is truncated to T_LEN=32 octets instead of 16 octets.
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The algorithm value A128CBCHS256 is used as the alg value when using AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 with JWE. The algorithm value A256CBCHS512 is used as the alg value when using AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 with JWE. In both cases, the Additional Authenticated Data value used is the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header value, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key. The JWE Initialization Vector value used is the IV value.
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This section defines the specifics of encrypting the JWE Plaintext with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.) [NIST.800‑38D] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC,” December 2001.) using 128 or 256 bit keys. The enc header parameter values A128GCM or A256GCM are used in this case.
The CEK is used as the encryption key.
Use of an initialization vector of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm.
The Additional Authenticated Data parameter is used to secure the header and key values. (The Additional Authenticated Data value used is the octets of the ASCII representation of the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key per Section 5 of the JWE specification.) This same Additional Authenticated Data value is used when decrypting as well.
The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits, regardless of the key size.
The JWE Authentication Tag is set to be the Authentication Tag value produced by the encryption. During decryption, the received JWE Authentication Tag is used as the Authentication Tag value.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” April 2013.).
Note: AES GCM MUST NOT be used when using the JWE JSON Serialization for multiple recipients, since this would result in the same Initialization Vector and Plaintext values being used for multiple GCM encryptions. This is prohibited by the GCM specification because of severe security vulnerabilities that would result, were GCM used in this way.
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Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWEs with corresponding alg (algorithm) and enc (encryption method) header parameter values being defined to refer to them. New alg and enc header parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry Section 6.1 (JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry) or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In particular, it is permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML Encryption (Eastlake, D. and J. Reagle, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing,” December 2002.) [W3C.REC‑xmlenc‑core‑20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Roessler, T., and F. Hirsch, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1,” March 2012.) [W3C.CR‑xmlenc‑core1‑20120313], and related specifications as alg and enc values.
As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common alg value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be distinct, as the alg value can be used to determine whether the object is a JWS or JWE.
Likewise, additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.). As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the specifications.
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A JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” April 2013.) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] (Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” July 2006.) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. A JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) is a JSON data structure for representing a set of JWKs. This section specifies a set of key types to be used for those keys and the key type specific parameters for representing those keys. Parameters are defined for public, private, and symmetric keys.
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The table below is the set of kty (key type) parameter values that are defined by this specification for use in JWKs.
kty Parameter Value  Key Type  Implementation Requirements 

EC  Elliptic Curve [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.) key type  RECOMMENDED+ 
RSA  RSA [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.) key type  REQUIRED 
oct  Octet sequence key type (used to represent symmetric keys)  RECOMMENDED+ 
All the names are short because a core goal of JWK is for the representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length restriction on kty values.
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.
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JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.) keys. In this case, the kty member value MUST be EC.
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These members MUST be present for Elliptic Curve public keys:
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The crv (curve) member identifies the cryptographic curve used with the key. Curve values from [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.) used by this specification are:
Additional crv values MAY be used, provided they are understood by implementations using that Elliptic Curve key. The crv value is a case sensitive string.
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The x (x coordinate) member contains the x coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the coordinate's big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 octets, including any leading zero octets.
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The y (y coordinate) member contains the y coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the coordinate's big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 octets, including any leading zero octets.
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In addition to the members used to represent Elliptic Curve public keys, the following member MUST be present to represent Elliptic Curve private keys:
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The d (ECC private key) member contains the Elliptic Curve private key value. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 octets, including any leading zero octets.
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JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.) keys. In this case, the kty member value MUST be RSA.
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These members MUST be present for RSA public keys:
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The n (modulus) member contains the modulus value for the RSA public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets. For instance, when representing 2048 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 256 octets, including any leading zero octets.
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The e (exponent) member contains the exponent value for the RSA public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the value. For instance, when representing the value 65537, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST consist of the three octets [1, 0, 1].
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In addition to the members used to represent RSA public keys, the following members are used to represent RSA private keys. All are REQUIRED for RSA private keys except for oth, which is sometimes REQUIRED and sometimes MUST NOT be present, as described below.
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The d (private exponent) member contains the private exponent value for the RSA private key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets. For instance, when representing 2048 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 256 octets, including any leading zero octets.
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The p (first prime factor) member contains the first prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
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The q (second prime factor) member contains the second prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
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The dp (first factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the first factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
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The dq (second factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the second factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
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The dp (first CRT coefficient) member contains the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) coefficient of the second factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
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The oth (other primes info) member contains an array of information about any third and subsequent primes, should they exist. When only two primes have been used (the normal case), this parameter MUST be omitted. When three or more primes have been used, the number of array elements MUST be the number of primes used minus two. Each array element MUST be an object with the following members:
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The r (prime factor) parameter within an oth array member represents the value of a subsequent prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
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The d (Factor CRT Exponent) parameter within an oth array member represents the CRT exponent of the corresponding prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
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The t (factor CRT coefficient) parameter within an oth array member represents the CRT coefficient of the corresponding prime factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
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When the JWK kty member value is oct (octet sequence), the following member is used to represent a symmetric key (or another key whose value is a single octet sequence):
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The k (key value) member contains the value of the symmetric (or other singlevalued) key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet sequence containing the key value.
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Keys using additional key types can be represented using JWK data structures with corresponding kty (key type) parameter values being defined to refer to them. New kty parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry Section 6.2 (JSON Web Key Types Registry) or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
Likewise, parameters for representing keys for additional key types or additional key properties SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” April 2013.) or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
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The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.
Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] (Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, “Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs,” May 2008.) after a twoweek review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for access token type: example"). [[ Note to RFCEDITOR: The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: joseregreview. ]]
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.
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This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry for values of the JWS and JWE alg (algorithm) and enc (encryption method) header parameters. The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm usage locations from the set alg and enc, implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same algorithm name MAY be registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint. The implementation requirements of an algorithm MAY be changed over time by the Designated Experts(s) as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to DEPRECATED, or to change the status of an algorithm from OPTIONAL to RECOMMENDED or REQUIRED.
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 Algorithm Name:
 The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
 Algorithm Usage Location(s):
 The algorithm usage, which must be one or more of the values alg or enc.
 Implementation Requirements:
 The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification.
 Change Controller:
 For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
 Specification Document(s):
 Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.
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This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry for values of the JWK kty (key type) parameter. The registry records the kty value and a reference to the specification that defines it. This specification registers the values defined in Section 5.1 ("kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values for JWK).
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 "kty" Parameter Value:
 The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
 Change Controller:
 For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
 Implementation Requirements:
 The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally, the word can be followed by a "+" or "". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification.
 Specification Document(s):
 Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.
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This specification registers the parameter names defined in Sections 5.2 (JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys), 5.3 (JWK Parameters for RSA Keys), and 5.3.3 (JWK Parameters for Symmetric Keys) in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” April 2013.).
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All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but some significant considerations are listed here.
The security considerations in [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.), [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.), [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” April 2013.), [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” April 2013.), [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” April 2013.), [NIST.800‑38A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,” December 2001.), [NIST.800‑38D] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC,” December 2001.), [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.), [RFC2104] (Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, “HMAC: KeyedHashing for Message Authentication,” February 1997.), [RFC3394] (Schaad, J. and R. Housley, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm,” September 2002.), [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.), [RFC5116] (McGrew, D., “An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption,” January 2008.), [RFC6090] (McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, “Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms,” February 2011.), and [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.) apply to this specification.
Eventually the algorithms and/or key sizes currently described in this specification will no longer be considered sufficiently secure and will be removed. Therefore, implementers and deployments must be prepared for this eventuality.
Algorithms of matching strengths should be used together whenever possible. For instance, when AES Key Wrap is used with a given key size, using the same key size is recommended when AES GCM is also used.
While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.) explicitly calls for people not to adopt RSASSAPKCS1 for new applications and instead requests that people transition to RSASSAPSS, this specification does include RSASSAPKCS1, for interoperability reasons, because it commonly implemented.
Keys used with RSAESPKCS1v1_5 must follow the constraints in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.). In particular, keys with a low public key exponent value must not be used.
Plaintext JWSs (JWSs that use the alg value none) provide no integrity protection. Thus, they must only be used in contexts where the payload is secured by means other than a digital signature or MAC value, or need not be secured.
Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could send certificates with keys that would result in excessive cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the processing element. Agents that use such keys without first validating the certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some sort of cryptographic resource management system to prevent such attacks.
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[AES]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” FIPS PUB 197, November 2001. 
[DSS]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” FIPS PUB 1863, June 2009. 
[JWE]  Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” draftietfjosejsonwebencryption (work in progress), April 2013 (HTML). 
[JWK]  Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” draftietfjosejsonwebkey (work in progress), April 2013 (HTML). 
[JWS]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” draftietfjosejsonwebsignature (work in progress), April 2013 (HTML). 
[NIST.80038A]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,” NIST PUB 80038A, December 2001. 
[NIST.80038D]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC,” NIST PUB 80038D, December 2001. 
[NIST.80056A]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” NIST PUB 80056A, March 2007. 
[RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, “HMAC: KeyedHashing for Message Authentication,” RFC 2104, February 1997 (TXT). 
[RFC2119]  Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML). 
[RFC3394]  Schaad, J. and R. Housley, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm,” RFC 3394, September 2002 (TXT). 
[RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., “UTF8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003 (TXT). 
[RFC4627]  Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” RFC 4627, July 2006 (TXT). 
[RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., “The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings,” RFC 4648, October 2006 (TXT). 
[RFC4868]  Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, “Using HMACSHA256, HMACSHA384, and HMACSHA512 with IPsec,” RFC 4868, May 2007 (TXT). 
[RFC5116]  McGrew, D., “An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption,” RFC 5116, January 2008 (TXT). 
[RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, “Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs,” BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008 (TXT). 
[RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, “Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms,” RFC 6090, February 2011 (TXT). 
[SHS]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” FIPS PUB 1803, October 2008. 
[USASCII]  American National Standards Institute, “Coded Character Set  7bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange,” ANSI X3.4, 1986. 
TOC 
[CanvasApp]  Facebook, “Canvas Applications,” 2010. 
[ID.mcgrewaeadaescbchmacsha2]  McGrew, D. and K. Paterson, “Authenticated Encryption with AESCBC and HMACSHA,” draftmcgrewaeadaescbchmacsha201 (work in progress), October 2012 (TXT). 
[ID.rescorlajsms]  Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, “JavaScript Message Security Format,” draftrescorlajsms00 (work in progress), March 2011 (TXT). 
[JCA]  Oracle, “Java Cryptography Architecture,” 2011. 
[JSE]  Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), “JSON Simple Encryption,” September 2010. 
[JSS]  Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), “JSON Simple Sign,” September 2010. 
[MagicSignatures]  Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, “Magic Signatures,” January 2011. 
[RFC3275]  Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, “(Extensible Markup Language) XMLSignature Syntax and Processing,” RFC 3275, March 2002 (TXT). 
[RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” RFC 3447, February 2003 (TXT). 
[RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, “A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace,” RFC 4122, July 2005 (TXT, HTML, XML). 
[W3C.CRxmldsigcore220120124]  Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Yiu, K., Solo, D., Datta, P., Hirsch, F., Cantor, S., and T. Roessler, “XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0,” World Wide Web Consortium CR CRxmldsigcore220120124, January 2012 (HTML). 
[W3C.CRxmlenccore120120313]  Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Roessler, T., and F. Hirsch, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1,” World Wide Web Consortium CR CRxmlenccore120120313, March 2012 (HTML). 
[W3C.RECxmlenccore20021210]  Eastlake, D. and J. Reagle, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing,” World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation RECxmlenccore20021210, December 2002 (HTML). 
TOC 
This appendix contains a table crossreferencing the digital signature and MAC alg (algorithm) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. See XML DSIG (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, “(Extensible Markup Language) XMLSignature Syntax and Processing,” March 2002.) [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Yiu, K., Solo, D., Datta, P., Hirsch, F., Cantor, S., and T. Roessler, “XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0,” January 2012.) [W3C.CR‑xmldsig‑core2‑20120124], and Java Cryptography Architecture (Oracle, “Java Cryptography Architecture,” 2011.) [JCA] for more information about the names defined by those documents.
Algorithm  JWS  XML DSIG  JCA  OID 

HMAC using SHA256 hash algorithm  HS256  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha256  HmacSHA256  1.2.840.113549.2.9 
HMAC using SHA384 hash algorithm  HS384  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha384  HmacSHA384  1.2.840.113549.2.10 
HMAC using SHA512 hash algorithm  HS512  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha512  HmacSHA512  1.2.840.113549.2.11 
RSASSA using SHA256 hash algorithm  RS256  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha256  SHA256withRSA  1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 
RSASSA using SHA384 hash algorithm  RS384  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha384  SHA384withRSA  1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 
RSASSA using SHA512 hash algorithm  RS512  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha512  SHA512withRSA  1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 
ECDSA using P256 curve and SHA256 hash algorithm  ES256  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha256  SHA256withECDSA  1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 
ECDSA using P384 curve and SHA384 hash algorithm  ES384  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha384  SHA384withECDSA  1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 
ECDSA using P521 curve and SHA512 hash algorithm  ES512  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha512  SHA512withECDSA  1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 
TOC 
This appendix contains a table crossreferencing the alg (algorithm) and enc (encryption method) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. See XML Encryption (Eastlake, D. and J. Reagle, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing,” December 2002.) [W3C.REC‑xmlenc‑core‑20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Roessler, T., and F. Hirsch, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1,” March 2012.) [W3C.CR‑xmlenc‑core1‑20120313], and Java Cryptography Architecture (Oracle, “Java Cryptography Architecture,” 2011.) [JCA] for more information about the names defined by those documents.
For the composite algorithms A128CBCHS256 and A256CBCHS512, the corresponding AES CBC algorithm identifiers are listed.
Algorithm  JWE  XML ENC  JCA 

RSAESPKCS1V1_5  RSA1_5  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa1_5  RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding 
RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)  RSAOAEP  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsaoaepmgf1p  RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA1AndMGF1Padding 
Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static  ECDHES  http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#ECDHES  
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm using 128 bit keys  A128KW  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwaes128  
AES Key Wrap Algorithm using 256 bit keys  A256KW  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwaes256  
AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding using 128 bit keys  A128CBCHS256  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128cbc  AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding 
AES in CBC mode with PKCS #5 padding using 256 bit keys  A256CBCHS512  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256cbc  AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding 
AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) using 128 bit keys  A128GCM  http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128gcm  AES/GCM/NoPadding 
AES GCM using 256 bit keys  A256GCM  http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes256gcm  AES/GCM/NoPadding 
TOC 
The following test cases can be used to validate implementations of the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms defined in Section 4.8 (AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms). They are also intended to correspond to test cases that may appear in a future version of [I‑D.mcgrew‑aead‑aes‑cbc‑hmac‑sha2] (McGrew, D. and K. Paterson, “Authenticated Encryption with AESCBC and HMACSHA,” October 2012.), demonstrating that the cryptographic computations performed are the same.
The variable names are those defined in Section 4.8 (AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms). All values are hexadecimal.
TOC 
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f ENC_KEY = 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65 IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04 A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73 AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 E = c8 0e df a3 2d df 39 d5 ef 00 c0 b4 68 83 42 79 a2 e4 6a 1b 80 49 f7 92 f7 6b fe 54 b9 03 a9 c9 a9 4a c9 b4 7a d2 65 5c 5f 10 f9 ae f7 14 27 e2 fc 6f 9b 3f 39 9a 22 14 89 f1 63 62 c7 03 23 36 09 d4 5a c6 98 64 e3 32 1c f8 29 35 ac 40 96 c8 6e 13 33 14 c5 40 19 e8 ca 79 80 df a4 b9 cf 1b 38 4c 48 6f 3a 54 c5 10 78 15 8e e5 d7 9d e5 9f bd 34 d8 48 b3 d6 95 50 a6 76 46 34 44 27 ad e5 4b 88 51 ff b5 98 f7 f8 00 74 b9 47 3c 82 e2 db M = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4 e6 e5 45 82 47 65 15 f0 ad 9f 75 a2 b7 1c 73 ef T = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4
TOC 
K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f ENC_KEY = 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20 6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75 69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65 74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62 65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69 6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f 75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65 IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04 A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63 69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20 4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73 AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 E = 4a ff aa ad b7 8c 31 c5 da 4b 1b 59 0d 10 ff bd 3d d8 d5 d3 02 42 35 26 91 2d a0 37 ec bc c7 bd 82 2c 30 1d d6 7c 37 3b cc b5 84 ad 3e 92 79 c2 e6 d1 2a 13 74 b7 7f 07 75 53 df 82 94 10 44 6b 36 eb d9 70 66 29 6a e6 42 7e a7 5c 2e 08 46 a1 1a 09 cc f5 37 0d c8 0b fe cb ad 28 c7 3f 09 b3 a3 b7 5e 66 2a 25 94 41 0a e4 96 b2 e2 e6 60 9e 31 e6 e0 2c c8 37 f0 53 d2 1f 37 ff 4f 51 95 0b be 26 38 d0 9d d7 a4 93 09 30 80 6d 07 03 b1 f6 M = 4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf 2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5 fd 30 a5 65 c6 16 ff b2 f3 64 ba ec e6 8f c4 07 53 bc fc 02 5d de 36 93 75 4a a1 f5 c3 37 3b 9c T = 4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf 2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5
TOC 
Solutions for signing and encrypting JSON content were previously explored by Magic Signatures (Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, “Magic Signatures,” January 2011.) [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign (Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), “JSON Simple Sign,” September 2010.) [JSS], Canvas Applications (Facebook, “Canvas Applications,” 2010.) [CanvasApp], JSON Simple Encryption (Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), “JSON Simple Encryption,” September 2010.) [JSE], and JavaScript Message Security Format (Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, “JavaScript Message Security Format,” March 2011.) [I‑D.rescorla‑jsms], all of which influenced this draft.
The Authenticated Encryption with AESCBC and HMACSHA (McGrew, D. and K. Paterson, “Authenticated Encryption with AESCBC and HMACSHA,” October 2012.) [I‑D.mcgrew‑aead‑aes‑cbc‑hmac‑sha2] specification, upon which the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms are based, was written by David A. McGrew and Kenny Paterson. The test cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 are based upon those for [I‑D.mcgrew‑aead‑aes‑cbc‑hmac‑sha2] (McGrew, D. and K. Paterson, “Authenticated Encryption with AESCBC and HMACSHA,” October 2012.) by John Foley.
This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that influenced this specification:
Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Breno de Medeiros, Yaron Y. Goland, Dick Hardt, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, James Manger, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart, Nat Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors during the creation of this specification.
TOC 
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
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Michael B. Jones  
Microsoft  
Email:  mbj@microsoft.com 
URI:  http://selfissued.info/ 