COSE Working Group | M. Jones |
Internet-Draft | Microsoft |
Intended status: Standards Track | December 31, 2016 |
Expires: July 4, 2017 |
Using RSA Algorithms with COSE Messages
draft-jones-cose-rsa-01
The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) specification defines cryptographic message encodings using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR). This specification defines algorithm encodings and representations enabling RSA algorithms to be used for COSE messages.
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The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] specification defines cryptographic message encodings using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049]. This specification defines algorithm encodings and representations enabling RSA algorithms to be used for COSE messages.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is defined in [RFC3447].
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is parameterized with a hash function (h), a mask generation function (mgf) and a salt length (sLen). For this specification, the mask generation function is fixed to be MGF1 as defined in [RFC3447]. It has been recommended that the same hash function be used for hashing the data as well as in the mask generation function. This specification follows this recommendation. The salt length is the same length as the hash function output.
Implementations need to check that the key type is 'RSA' when creating or verifying a signature.
The algorithms defined in this document can be found in Table 1.
Name | Value | Hash | Salt Length | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
PS256 | -37 | SHA-256 | 32 | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-256 |
PS384 | -38 | SHA-384 | 48 | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-384 |
PS512 | -39 | SHA-512 | 64 | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-512 |
In addition to needing to worry about keys that are too small to provide the required security, there are issues with keys that are too large. Denial of service attacks have been mounted with overly large keys. This has the potential to consume resources with potentially bad keys. There are two reasonable ways to address this attack. First, a key should not be used for a cryptographic operation until it has been matched back to an authorized user. This approach means that no cryptography would be done except for authorized users. Second, applications can impose maximum as well as minimum length requirements on keys. This limits the resources consumed even if the matching is not performed until the cryptography has been done.
There is a theoretical hash substitution attack that can be mounted against RSASSA-PSS. However, the requirement that the same hash function be used consistently for all operations is an effective mitigation against it. Unlike ECDSA, hash functions are not truncated so that the full hash value is always signed. The internal padding structure of RSASSA-PSS means that one needs to have multiple collisions between the two hash functions to be successful in producing a forgery based on changing the hash function. This is highly unlikely.
Key Encryption mode is also called key transport mode in some standards. Key Encryption mode differs from Key Wrap mode in that it uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm rather than a symmetric encryption algorithm to protect the key. This document defines one Key Encryption mode algorithm.
When using a key encryption algorithm, the COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:
RSAES-OAEP is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm. The definition of RSAEA-OAEP can be find in Section 7.1 of [RFC3447]. The algorithm is parameterized using a masking generation function (mgf), a hash function (h) and encoding parameters (P). For the algorithm identifiers defined in this section: Table 2 summarizes the rest of the values.
Name | Value | Hash | Description |
---|---|---|---|
RSAES-OAEP w/ default parameters | -40 | SHA-1 | RSAES OAEP w/ SHA-1 |
RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-256 | -41 | SHA-256 | RSAES OAEP w/ SHA-256 |
RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-512 | -42 | SHA-512 | RSAES OAEP w/ SHA-512 |
The key type MUST be 'RSA'.
A key size of 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. This key size corresponds roughly to the same strength as provided by a 128-bit symmetric encryption algorithm.
It is highly recommended that checks on the key length be done before starting a decryption operation. One potential denial of service operation is to provide encrypted objects using either abnormally long or oddly sized RSA modulus values. Implementations SHOULD be able to encrypt and decrypt with modulus between 2048 and 16K bits in length. Applications can impose additional restrictions on the length of the modulus.
A version of RSAES-OAEP using the default parameters specified in Appendix A.2.1 of RFC 3447 is included because this is the most widely implemented set of OAEP parameter choices. (Those default parameters are the SHA-1 hash function and the MGF1 with SHA-1 mask generation function.) While SHA-1 is deprecated as a general-purpose hash function, no known practical attacks are enabled by its use in this context.
Key types are identified by the 'kty' member of the COSE_Key object. This specification defines one value for this member.
Name | Value | Description |
---|---|---|
RSA | 3 | RSA Key |
This document defines a key structure for both the public and private parts of RSA keys. Together, an RSA public key and an RSA private key form an RSA key pair.
The document also provides support for the so-called "multi-prime" RSA keys, in which the modulus may have more than two prime factors. The benefit of multi-prime RSA is lower computational cost for the decryption and signature primitives. For a discussion on how multi-prime affects the security of RSA crypto-systems, the reader is referred to [MultiPrimeRSA].
This document follows the naming convention of [RFC3447] for the naming of the fields of an RSA public or private key. Table 4 provides a summary of the label values and the types associated with each of those labels. The requirements for fields for RSA keys are as follows:
Name | Key Type | Value | Type | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
n | 3 | -1 | bstr | Modulus Parameter |
e | 3 | -2 | bstr | Exponent Parameter |
d | 3 | -3 | bstr | Private Exponent Parameter |
p | 3 | -4 | bstr | First Prime Factor |
q | 3 | -5 | bstr | Second Prime Factor |
dP | 3 | -6 | bstr | First Factor CRT Exponent |
dQ | 3 | -7 | bstr | Second Factor CRT Exponent |
qInv | 3 | -8 | bstr | First CRT Coefficient |
other | 3 | -9 | array | Other Primes Info |
r_i | 3 | -10 | bstr | i-th factor, Prime Factor |
d_i | 3 | -11 | bstr | i-th factor, Factor CRT Exponent |
t_i | 3 | -12 | bstr | i-th factor, Factor CRT Coefficient |
This section registers values in the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry.
The values in Table 1 and Table 2 are to be added to the registry.
This section registers values in the IANA "COSE Key Types" registry.
The values in Table 3 are to be added to the registry.
This section registers values in the IANA "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry.
The values in Table 4 are to be added to the registry.
See the per-algorithm security considerations described in Section 2.1.1 and Section 3.1.1.1.
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] | Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-cose-msg-24, November 2016. |
[RFC2119] | Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997. |
[RFC3447] | Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February 2003. |
[RFC7049] | Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, October 2013. |
[MultiPrimeRSA] | Hinek, M. and D. Cheriton, "On the Security of Multi-prime RSA", June 2006. |
This specification incorporates text from draft-ietf-cose-msg-05 by Jim Schaad.
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
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