OAuth W. Denniss
Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Standards Track S. Myrseth
Expires: September 4, 2016 ForgeRock
J. Bradley
Ping Identity
M. Jones
H. Tschofenig
ARM Limited
March 3, 2016

OAuth 2.0 Device Flow


The device flow is suitable for OAuth 2.0 clients executing on devices that do not have an easy data-entry method (e.g., game consoles, TVs, picture frames, and media hubs), but where the end-user has separate access to a user-agent on another computer or device (e.g., desktop computer, a laptop, a smart phone, or a tablet).

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The device flow is suitable for clients executing on devices that do not have an easy data-entry method and where the client is incapable of receiving incoming requests from the authorization server (incapable of acting as an HTTP server).

Instead of interacting with the end-user's user-agent, the client instructs the end-user to use another computer or device and connect to the authorization server to approve the access request. Since the client cannot receive incoming requests, it polls the authorization server repeatedly until the end-user completes the approval process.

Note that this device flow does not utilize the client secret.

   +----------+                                +----------------+
   |          |>---(A)-- Client Identifier --->|                |
   |          |                                |                |
   |          |<---(B)-- Verification Code, --<|                |
   |          |              User Code,        |                |
   |          |         & Verification URI     |                |
   |  Device  |                                |                |
   |  Client  |         Client Identifier &    |                |
   |          |>---(E)-- Verification Code --->|                |
   |          |    ...                         |                |
   |          |>---(E)--->                     |                |
   |          |                                |  Authorization |
   |          |<---(F)-- Access Token --------<|     Server     |
   +----------+  (w/ Optional Refresh Token)   |                |
         v                                     |                |
         :                                     |                |
        (C) User Code & Verification URI       |                |
         :                                     |                |
         v                                     |                |
   +----------+                                |                |
   | End-user |                                |                |
   |    at    |<---(D)-- User authenticates -->|                |
   |  Browser |                                |                |
   +----------+                                +----------------+

Figure 1: Device Flow.

The device flow illustrated in Figure 1 includes the following steps:

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Device Endpoint:

The authorization server's endpoint capable of issuing verification codes, user codes, and verification URLs.
Device Verification Code:

A short-lived token representing an authorization session.
End-User Verification Code:

A short-lived token which the device displays to the end user, is entered by the end-user on the authorization sever, and is thus used to bind the device to the end-user.

3. Specification

3.1. Client Requests Authorization

The client initiates the flow by requesting a set of verification codes from the authorization server by making an HTTP "POST" request to the device endpoint. The client constructs a request URI by adding the following parameters to the request:


REQUIRED. The parameter value MUST be set to "device_code".

REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC6749].

OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by Section 3.3 of [RFC6749].

   POST /token HTTP/1.1
   Host: server.example.com
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded


For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line breaks are for display purposes only):

In response, the authorization server generates a verification code and an end-user code and includes them in the HTTP response body using the "application/json" format with a 200 status code (OK). The response contains the following parameters:


REQUIRED. The verification code.

REQUIRED. The end-user verification code.

REQUIRED. The end-user verification URI on the authorization server. The URI should be short and easy to remember as end- users will be asked to manually type it into their user-agent.

OPTIONAL. The duration in seconds of the verification code lifetime.

OPTIONAL. The minimum amount of time in seconds that the client SHOULD wait between polling requests to the token endpoint.

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Cache-Control: no-store


For example:

The client displays the end-user code and the end-user verification URI to the end-user, and instructs the end-user to visit the URI using a user-agent and enter the end-user code.

The end-user manually types the provided verification URI and authenticates with the authorization server. The authorization server prompts the end-user to authorize the client's request by entering the end-user code provided by the client. Once the end-user approves or denies the request, the authorization server informs the end-user to return to the device for further instructions.

3.2. Client Requests Access Token

Since the client is unable to receive incoming requests from the authorization server, it polls the authorization server repeatedly until the end-user grants or denies the request, or the verification code expires.

The client makes the following request at an arbitrary but reasonable interval which MUST NOT exceed the minimum interval rate provided by the authorization server (if present via the "interval" parameter). Alternatively, the client MAY provide a user interface for the end- user to manually inform it when authorization was granted.

The client requests an access token by making an HTTP "POST" request to the token endpoint as described in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC6749] . The "redirect_uri" parameter is NOT REQUIRED as part of this request.

3.3. Additional Error Responses

The following error responses are defined in addition to those within Section of [RFC6749]:


The authorization request is still pending as the end-user hasn't yet visited the authorization server and entered their verification code.

The client is polling too quickly and should back off at a reasonable rate.

4. Security Considerations


5. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012.

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

The -00 version of this document was based on draft-recordon-oauth-v2-device edited by David Recordon and Brent Goldman. The content of that document was initially part of the OAuth 2.0 protocol specification but was later removed due to the lack of sufficient deployment expertise at that time. We would therefore also like to thank the OAuth working group for their work on the initial content of this specification through 2010.

Appendix B. Document History

[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]



Authors' Addresses

William Denniss Google 1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy Mountain View, CA 94043 USA Phone: +1 650-253-0000 EMail: wdenniss@google.com URI: http://google.com/
Stein Myrseth ForgeRock Lysaker torg 2 Lysaker, 1366 NORWAY EMail: stein.myrseth@forgerock.com
John Bradley Ping Identity EMail: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
Michael B. Jones Microsoft EMail: mbj@microsoft.com URI: http://self-issued.info/
Hannes Tschofenig ARM Limited Austria EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at