TOC 

The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications.
This InternetDraft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This InternetDraft will expire on January 17, 2013.
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
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1.
Introduction
1.1.
Notational Conventions
2.
Terminology
2.1.
Terms Incorporated from the JWS Specification
2.2.
Terms Incorporated from the JWE Specification
2.3.
Terms Incorporated from the JWK Specification
2.4.
Defined Terms
3.
Cryptographic Algorithms for JWS
3.1.
"alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS
3.2.
MAC with HMAC SHA256, HMAC SHA384, or HMAC SHA512
3.3.
Digital Signature with RSA SHA256, RSA SHA384, or RSA SHA512
3.4.
Digital Signature with ECDSA P256 SHA256, ECDSA P384 SHA384, or ECDSA P521 SHA512
3.5.
Using the Algorithm "none"
3.6.
Additional Digital Signature/MAC Algorithms and Parameters
4.
Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE
4.1.
"alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE
4.2.
"enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter Values for JWE
4.3.
"int" (Integrity Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE
4.4.
"kdf" (Key Derivation Function) Header Parameter Values for JWE
4.5.
Key Encryption with RSAESPKCS1V1_5
4.6.
Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP
4.7.
Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static (ECDHES)
4.8.
Key Encryption with AES Key Wrap
4.9.
Plaintext Encryption with AES CBC Mode
4.10.
Plaintext Encryption with AES GCM
4.11.
Integrity Calculation with HMAC SHA256, HMAC SHA384, or HMAC SHA512
4.12.
Key Derivation with Concat KDF and SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512
4.13.
Additional Encryption Algorithms and Parameters
5.
Cryptographic Algorithms for JWK
5.1.
"alg" (Algorithm Family) Parameter Values for JWK
5.2.
JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys
5.2.1.
"crv" (Curve) Parameter
5.2.2.
"x" (X Coordinate) Parameter
5.2.3.
"y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter
5.3.
JWK Parameters for RSA Keys
5.3.1.
"mod" (Modulus) Parameter
5.3.2.
"exp" (Exponent) Parameter
5.4.
Additional Key Algorithm Families and Parameters
6.
IANA Considerations
6.1.
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry
6.1.1.
Registration Template
6.1.2.
Initial Registry Contents
6.2.
JSON Web Key Algorithm Families Registry
6.2.1.
Registration Template
6.2.2.
Initial Registry Contents
6.3.
JSON Web Key Parameters Registration
6.3.1.
Registry Contents
7.
Security Considerations
8.
Open Issues
9.
References
9.1.
Normative References
9.2.
Informative References
Appendix A.
Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier CrossReference
Appendix B.
Encryption Algorithm Identifier CrossReference
Appendix C.
Acknowledgements
Appendix D.
Document History
§
Author's Address
TOC 
The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July 2012.), JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July 2012.), and JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” July 2012.) specifications. All these specifications utilize JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] (Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” July 2006.) based data structures. This specification also describes the semantics and operations that are specific to these algorithms and algorithm families.
Enumerating the algorithms and identifiers for them in this specification, rather than in the JWS, JWE, and JWK specifications, is intended to allow them to remain unchanged in the face of changes in the set of required, recommended, optional, and deprecated algorithms over time.
TOC 
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.).
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TOC 
These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July 2012.) specification are incorporated into this specification:
 JSON Web Signature (JWS)
 A data structure cryptographically securing a JWS Header and a JWS Payload with a JWS Signature value.
 JWS Header
 A string representing a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] (Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” July 2006.) object that describes the digital signature or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value.
 JWS Payload
 The bytes to be secured  a.k.a., the message. The payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of bytes.
 JWS Signature
 A byte array containing the cryptographic material that secures the contents of the JWS Header and the JWS Payload.
 Base64url Encoding
 The URL and filenamesafe Base64 encoding described in RFC 4648 (Josefsson, S., “The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings,” October 2006.) [RFC4648], Section 5, with the (non URLsafe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2. (See Appendix C of [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July 2012.) for notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding.)
 Encoded JWS Header
 Base64url encoding of the bytes of the UTF8 [RFC3629] (Yergeau, F., “UTF8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” November 2003.) representation of the JWS Header.
 Encoded JWS Payload
 Base64url encoding of the JWS Payload.
 Encoded JWS Signature
 Base64url encoding of the JWS Signature.
 JWS Secured Input
 The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload.
 Collision Resistant Namespace
 A namespace that allows names to be allocated in a manner such that they are highly unlikely to collide with other names. For instance, collision resistance can be achieved through administrative delegation of portions of the namespace or through use of collisionresistant name allocation functions. Examples of Collision Resistant Namespaces include: Domain Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITUT X.660 and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUIDs) [RFC4122] (Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, “A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace,” July 2005.). When using an administratively delegated namespace, the definer of a name needs to take reasonable precautions to ensure they are in control of the portion of the namespace they use to define the name.
TOC 
These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July 2012.) specification are incorporated into this specification:
 JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
 A data structure representing an encrypted version of a Plaintext. The structure consists of four parts: the JWE Header, the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Ciphertext, and the JWE Integrity Value.
 Plaintext
 The bytes to be encrypted  a.k.a., the message. The plaintext can contain an arbitrary sequence of bytes.
 Ciphertext
 The encrypted version of the Plaintext.
 Content Encryption Key (CEK)
 A symmetric key used to encrypt the Plaintext for the recipient to produce the Ciphertext.
 Content Integrity Key (CIK)
 A key used with a MAC function to ensure the integrity of the Ciphertext and the parameters used to create it.
 Content Master Key (CMK)
 A key from which the CEK and CIK are derived. When key wrapping or key encryption are employed, the CMK is randomly generated and encrypted to the recipient as the JWE Encrypted Key. When key agreement is employed, the CMK is the result of the key agreement algorithm.
 JWE Header
 A string representing a JSON object that describes the encryption operations applied to create the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Ciphertext, and the JWE Integrity Value.
 JWE Encrypted Key
 When key wrapping or key encryption are employed, the Content Master Key (CMK) is encrypted with the intended recipient's key and the resulting encrypted content is recorded as a byte array, which is referred to as the JWE Encrypted Key. Otherwise, when key agreement is employed, the JWE Encrypted Key is the empty byte array.
 JWE Ciphertext
 A byte array containing the Ciphertext.
 JWE Integrity Value
 A byte array containing a MAC value that ensures the integrity of the Ciphertext and the parameters used to create it.
 Encoded JWE Header
 Base64url encoding of the bytes of the UTF8 [RFC3629] (Yergeau, F., “UTF8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” November 2003.) representation of the JWE Header.
 Encoded JWE Encrypted Key
 Base64url encoding of the JWE Encrypted Key.
 Encoded JWE Ciphertext
 Base64url encoding of the JWE Ciphertext.
 Encoded JWE Integrity Value
 Base64url encoding of the JWE Integrity Value.
 AEAD Algorithm
 An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) [RFC5116] (McGrew, D., “An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption,” January 2008.) encryption algorithm is one that provides an integrated content integrity check. AES Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is one such algorithm.
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These terms defined by the JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” July 2012.) specification are incorporated into this specification:
 JSON Web Key (JWK)
 A JSON data structure that represents a public key.
 JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set)
 A JSON object that contains an array of JWKs as a member.
TOC 
These terms are defined for use by this specification:
 Header Parameter Name
 The name of a member of the JSON object representing a JWS Header or JWE Header.
 Header Parameter Value
 The value of a member of the JSON object representing a JWS Header or JWE Header.
TOC 
JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or create a Message Authentication Codes (MAC) of the contents of the JWS Header and the JWS Payload. The use of the following algorithms for producing JWSs is defined in this section.
TOC 
The table below is the set of alg (algorithm) header parameter values defined by this specification for use with JWS, each of which is explained in more detail in the following sections:
alg Parameter Value  Digital Signature or MAC Algorithm  Implementation Requirements 

HS256  HMAC using SHA256 hash algorithm  REQUIRED 
HS384  HMAC using SHA384 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
HS512  HMAC using SHA512 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
RS256  RSASSA using SHA256 hash algorithm  RECOMMENDED 
RS384  RSASSA using SHA384 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
RS512  RSASSA using SHA512 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
ES256  ECDSA using P256 curve and SHA256 hash algorithm  RECOMMENDED+ 
ES384  ECDSA using P384 curve and SHA384 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
ES512  ECDSA using P521 curve and SHA512 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
none  No digital signature or MAC value included  REQUIRED 
All the names are short because a core goal of JWS is for the representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length restriction on alg values.
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.
See Appendix A (Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier CrossReference) for a table crossreferencing the digital signature and MAC alg (algorithm) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.
TOC 
Hashbased Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that the MAC matches the hashed content, in this case the JWS Secured Input, which therefore demonstrates that whoever generated the MAC was in possession of the secret. The means of exchanging the shared key is outside the scope of this specification.
The algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in RFC 2104 (Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, “HMAC: KeyedHashing for Message Authentication,” February 1997.) [RFC2104]. This section defines the use of the HMAC SHA256, HMAC SHA384, and HMAC SHA512 functions [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.). The alg (algorithm) header parameter values HS256, HS384, and HS512 are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded HMAC value using the respective hash function.
A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for HS256) or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
The HMAC SHA256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the bytes of the ASCII [USASCII] (American National Standards Institute, “Coded Character Set  7bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange,” 1986.) representation of the JWS Secured Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS Signature. The JWS signature is base64url encoded to produce the Encoded JWS Signature.
The HMAC SHA256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC value per RFC 2104, using SHA256 as the hash algorithm "H", using the bytes of the ASCII representation of the received JWS Secured input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. This computed HMAC value is then compared to the result of base64url decoding the received Encoded JWS signature. Alternatively, the computed HMAC value can be base64url encoded and compared to the received Encoded JWS Signature, as this comparison produces the same result as comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match, the HMAC has been validated. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
Securing content with the HMAC SHA384 and HMAC SHA512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA256  just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger minimum key sizes and result values: 384 bits each for HMAC SHA384 and 512 bits each for HMAC SHA512.
TOC 
This section defines the use of the RSASSAPKCS1V1_5 digital signature algorithm as defined in Section 8.2 of RFC 3447 (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.) [RFC3447], (commonly known as PKCS #1), using SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512 [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.) as the hash functions. The alg (algorithm) header parameter values RS256, RS384, and RS512 are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded RSA digital signature using the respective hash function.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms.
The RSA SHA256 digital signature is generated as follows:
The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for that JWS.
The RSA SHA256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:
Signing with the RSA SHA384 and RSA SHA512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for RSA SHA256  just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger result values: 384 bits for RSA SHA384 and 512 bits for RSA SHA512.
TOC 
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.) provides for the use of Elliptic Curve cryptography, which is able to provide equivalent security to RSA cryptography but using shorter key sizes and with greater processing speed. This means that ECDSA digital signatures will be substantially smaller in terms of length than equivalently strong RSA digital signatures.
This specification defines the use of ECDSA with the P256 curve and the SHA256 cryptographic hash function, ECDSA with the P384 curve and the SHA384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P521 curve and the SHA512 hash function. The P256, P384, and P521 curves are defined in [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.). The alg (algorithm) header parameter values ES256, ES384, and ES512 are used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded ECDSA P256 SHA256, ECDSA P384 SHA384, or ECDSA P521 SHA512 digital signature, respectively.
The ECDSA P256 SHA256 digital signature is generated as follows:
The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for the JWS.
The ECDSA P256 SHA256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:
Note that ECDSA digital signature contains a value referred to as K, which is a random number generated for each digital signature instance. This means that two ECDSA digital signatures using exactly the same input parameters will output different signature values because their K values will be different. A consequence of this is that one cannot validate an ECDSA signature by recomputing the signature and comparing the results.
Signing with the ECDSA P384 SHA384 and ECDSA P521 SHA512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P256 SHA256  just using the corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P384 SHA384, R and S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96 byte array. For ECDSA P521 SHA512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a 132 byte array.
TOC 
JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection. Such a JWS is called a "Plaintext JWS". Plaintext JWSs MUST use the alg value none, and are formatted identically to other JWSs, but with an empty JWS Signature value.
TOC 
Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWSs with corresponding alg (algorithm) header parameter values being defined to refer to them. New alg header parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry Section 6.1 (JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry) or be a URI that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In particular, it is permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML DSIG (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, “(Extensible Markup Language) XMLSignature Syntax and Processing,” March 2002.) [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 (Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., Cantor, S., Roessler, T., Eastlake, D., Yiu, K., Solo, D., and P. Datta, “XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0,” January 2012.) [W3C.CR‑xmldsig‑core2‑20120124], and related specifications as alg values.
As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common alg value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be distinct, as the alg value MAY be used to determine whether the object is a JWS or JWE.
Likewise, additional reserved header parameter names MAY be defined via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July 2012.). As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the specifications.
TOC 
JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt the Content Master Key (CMK) and the Plaintext. This section specifies a set of specific algorithms for these purposes.
TOC 
The table below is the set of alg (algorithm) header parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the CMK, producing the JWE Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CMK.
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.
TOC 
The table below is the set of enc (encryption method) header parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the Plaintext, which produces the Ciphertext.
enc Parameter Value  Block Encryption Algorithm  Implementation Requirements 

A128CBC  Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.) [NIST.800‑38A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,” December 2001.) using 128 bit keys  REQUIRED 
A256CBC  AES in CBC mode with PKCS #5 padding using 256 bit keys  REQUIRED 
A128GCM  AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.) [NIST.800‑38D] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC,” December 2001.) using 128 bit keys  RECOMMENDED 
A256GCM  AES GCM using 256 bit keys  RECOMMENDED 
All the names are short because a core goal of JWE is for the representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length restriction on alg values.
See Appendix B (Encryption Algorithm Identifier CrossReference) for a table crossreferencing the encryption alg (algorithm) and enc (encryption method) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.
TOC 
The table below is the set of int (integrity algorithm) header parameter values defined by this specification for use with JWE. Note that these are the HMAC SHA subset of the alg (algorithm) header parameter values defined for use with JWS Section 3.1 ("alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS).
int Parameter Value  Algorithm  Implementation Requirements 

HS256  HMAC using SHA256 hash algorithm  REQUIRED 
HS384  HMAC using SHA384 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
HS512  HMAC using SHA512 hash algorithm  OPTIONAL 
TOC 
The table below is the set of kdf (key derivation function) header parameter values defined by this specification for use with JWE.
kdf Parameter Value  Algorithm  Implementation Requirements 

CS256  Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.), with parameters per Section 4.12 (Key Derivation with Concat KDF and SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512), using SHA256 as the digest method  REQUIRED 
CS384  Concat KDF with parameters per Section 4.12 (Key Derivation with Concat KDF and SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512), using SHA384 as the digest method  OPTIONAL 
CS512  Concat KDF with parameters per Section 4.12 (Key Derivation with Concat KDF and SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512), using SHA512 as the digest method  OPTIONAL 
TOC 
This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CMK with RSAESPKCS1V1_5 [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.). The alg header parameter value RSA1_5 is used in this case.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
TOC 
This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CMK with RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.), with the default parameters specified by RFC 3447 in Section A.2.1. The alg header parameter value RSAOAEP is used in this case.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
TOC 
This section defines the specifics of agreeing upon a JWE CMK with Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090] (McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, “Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms,” February 2011.), and using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.), where the Digest Method is SHA256 and all OtherInfo parameters are the empty bit string. The alg header parameter value ECDHES is used in this case.
The output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the same length as that used by the enc algorithm.
A new epk (ephemeral public key) value MUST be generated for each key agreement transaction.
TOC 
This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CMK with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] (Schaad, J. and R. Housley, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm,” September 2002.) using 128 or 256 bit keys. The alg header parameter values A128KW or A256KW are used in this case.
TOC 
This section defines the specifics of encrypting the JWE Plaintext with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.) [NIST.800‑38A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,” December 2001.) using 128 or 256 bit keys. The enc header parameter values A128CBC or A256CBC are used in this case.
Use of an initialization vector of size 128 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm.
TOC 
This section defines the specifics of encrypting the JWE Plaintext with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.) [NIST.800‑38D] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC,” December 2001.) using 128 or 256 bit keys. The enc header parameter values A128GCM or A256GCM are used in this case.
Use of an initialization vector of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this algorithm.
The "additional authenticated data" parameter is used to secure the header and key values, as specified for AEAD algorithms in Section 5 of [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July 2012.).
The requested size of the "authentication tag" output MUST be 128 bits, regardless of the key size.
As GCM is an AEAD algorithm, the JWE Integrity Value is set to be the "authentication tag" value produced by the encryption.
TOC 
This section defines the specifics of computing a JWE Integrity Value with HMAC SHA256, HMAC SHA384, or HMAC SHA512 [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.). Other than as stated below, these computations are performed identically to those specified in Section 3.2 (MAC with HMAC SHA256, HMAC SHA384, or HMAC SHA512).
A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for HS256) MUST be used with this algorithm.
Per Section 9 of [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July 2012.), the JWS Secured Input value used contains the header, encrypted key, and ciphertext.
TOC 
The key derivation process derives CEK and CIK values from the CMK. It uses as a primitive a Key Derivation Function (KDF) which notionally takes three arguments:
 MasterKey:
 The master key used to compute the individual use keys
 Label:
 The use key label, used to differentiate individual use keys
 Length:
 The desired length of the use key
This section defines the specifics of using the Concat KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.), where the Digest Method is one of SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512, the SuppPubInfo parameter is the Label, and the remaining OtherInfo parameters are the empty bit string.
The kdf (key derivation function) header parameter values CS256, CS384, and CS512 are respectively used in the JWE Header to indicate the use of the Concat KDF as above with the respective digest methods. If the kdf header parameter is omitted when an AEAD enc algorithm is not used, this is equivalent to specifying use of the CS256 key derivation function.
To compute the CEK from the CMK, the ASCII label "Encryption" ([69, 110, 99, 114, 121, 112, 116, 105, 111, 110]) is used. Use the key size for the enc algorithm as the CEK desired key length.
To compute the CIK from the CMK, the ASCII label "Integrity" ([73, 110, 116, 101, 103, 114, 105, 116, 121]) is used. Use the minimum key size for the int algorithm (for instance, 256 bits for HS256) as the CIK desired key length.
TOC 
Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWEs with corresponding alg (algorithm), enc (encryption method), and int (integrity algorithm) header parameter values being defined to refer to them. New alg, enc, and int header parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry Section 6.1 (JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry) or be a URI that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In particular, it is permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML Encryption (Eastlake, D. and J. Reagle, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing,” December 2002.) [W3C.REC‑xmlenc‑core‑20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., and T. Roessler, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1,” March 2012.) [W3C.CR‑xmlenc‑core1‑20120313], and related specifications as alg, enc, and int values.
As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common alg value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be distinct, as the alg value MAY be used to determine whether the object is a JWS or JWE.
Likewise, additional reserved header parameter names MAY be defined via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July 2012.). As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the specifications.
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A JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” July 2012.) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] (Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” July 2006.) data structure that represents a public key. A JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) is a JSON data structure for representing a set of JWKs. This section specifies a set of algorithm families to be used for those public keys and the algorithm family specific parameters for representing those keys.
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The table below is the set of alg (algorithm family) parameter values that are defined by this specification for use in JWKs.
alg Parameter Value  Algorithm Family  Implementation Requirements 

EC  Elliptic Curve [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.) key family  RECOMMENDED+ 
RSA  RSA [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.) key family  REQUIRED 
All the names are short because a core goal of JWK is for the representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length restriction on alg values.
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification.
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JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.) keys. In this case, the alg member value MUST be EC. Furthermore, these additional members MUST be present:
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The crv (curve) member identifies the cryptographic curve used with the key. Curve values from [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.) used by this specification are:
Additional crv values MAY be used, provided they are understood by implementations using that Elliptic Curve key. The crv value is a case sensitive string.
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The x (x coordinate) member contains the x coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the coordinate's big endian representation as a byte array. The array representation MUST not be shortened to omit any leading zero bytes contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the byte array to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 bytes, including any leading zero bytes.
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The y (y coordinate) member contains the y coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the coordinate's big endian representation as a byte array. The array representation MUST not be shortened to omit any leading zero bytes contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the byte array to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 bytes, including any leading zero bytes.
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JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.) keys. In this case, the alg member value MUST be RSA. Furthermore, these additional members MUST be present:
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The mod (modulus) member contains the modulus value for the RSA public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as a byte array. The array representation MUST not be shortened to omit any leading zero bytes. For instance, when representing 2048 bit integers, the byte array to be base64url encoded MUST contain 256 bytes, including any leading zero bytes.
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The exp (exponent) member contains the exponent value for the RSA public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as a byte array. The array representation MUST utilize the minimum number of bytes to represent the value. For instance, when representing the value 65537, the byte array to be base64url encoded MUST consist of the three bytes [1, 0, 1].
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Public keys using additional algorithm families MAY be represented using JWK data structures with corresponding alg (algorithm family) parameter values being defined to refer to them. New alg parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Algorithm Families registry Section 6.2 (JSON Web Key Algorithm Families Registry) or be a URI that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
Likewise, parameters for representing keys for additional algorithm families or additional key properties SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” July 2012.) or be a URI that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
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The following registration procedure is used for all the registries established by this specification.
Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] (Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, “Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs,” May 2008.) after a two week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for access token type: example"). [[ Note to RFCEDITOR: The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: joseregreview. ]]
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s), and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.
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This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry for values of the JWS and JWE alg (algorithm), enc (encryption method), and int (integrity algorithm) header parameters. The registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm usage locations from the set alg, enc, and int, implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same algorithm name may be registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint. The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over time by the Designated Experts(s) as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to DEPRECATED, or to change the status of an algorithm from OPTIONAL to RECOMMENDED or REQUIRED.
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 Algorithm Name:
 The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
 Algorithm Usage Location(s):
 The algorithm usage, which must be one or more of the values alg, enc, int, or kdf.
 Implementation Requirements:
 The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally, the word may be followed by a "+" or "". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification.
 Change Controller:
 For standardstrack RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
 Specification Document(s):
 Reference to the document that specifies the parameter, preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of the document. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included, but is not required.
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This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Algorithm Families registry for values of the JWK alg (algorithm family) parameter. The registry records the alg value and a reference to the specification that defines it. This specification registers the values defined in Section 5.1 ("alg" (Algorithm Family) Parameter Values for JWK).
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 "alg" Parameter Value:
 The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
 Change Controller:
 For standardstrack RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
 Implementation Requirements:
 The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally, the word may be followed by a "+" or "". The use of "+" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of the specification. The use of "" indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a future version of the specification.
 Specification Document(s):
 Reference to the document that specifies the parameter, preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of the document. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included, but is not required.
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This specification registers the parameter names defined in Section 5.2 (JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys) and Section 5.3 (JWK Parameters for RSA Keys) in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” July 2012.).
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All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are protecting the user's private key, preventing various attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but some significant concerns are listed here.
The security considerations in [AES] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” November 2001.), [DSS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” June 2009.), [JWE] (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July 2012.), [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” July 2012.), [JWS] (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July 2012.), [NIST.800‑38A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,” December 2001.), [NIST.800‑38D] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC,” December 2001.), [NIST.800‑56A] (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Recommendation for PairWise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),” March 2007.), [RFC2104] (Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, “HMAC: KeyedHashing for Message Authentication,” February 1997.), [RFC3394] (Schaad, J. and R. Housley, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm,” September 2002.), [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.), [RFC5116] (McGrew, D., “An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption,” January 2008.), [RFC6090] (McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, “Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms,” February 2011.), and [SHS] (National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” October 2008.) apply to this specification.
Eventually the algorithms and/or key sizes currently described in this specification will no longer be considered sufficiently secure and will be removed. Therefore, implementers and deployments must be prepared for this eventuality.
Algorithms of matching strength should be used together whenever possible. For instance, when AES Key Wrap is used with a given key size, using the same key size for AES CBC or GCM is recommended. Likewise, when AES CBC is used with a 128 bit key, using HMAC SHA256 as the integrity algorithm is recommended, whereas when AES CBC is used with a 256 bit key, using HMAC SHA512 as the integrity algorithm is recommended.
While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.) explicitly calls for people not to adopt RSASSAPKCS1 for new applications and instead requests that people transition to RSASSAPSS, this specification does include RSASSAPKCS1, for interoperability reasons, because it commonly implemented.
Keys used with RSAESPKCS1v1_5 must follow the constraints in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] (Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, “PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,” February 2003.). In particular, keys with a low public key exponent value must not be used.
Plaintext JWSs (JWSs that use the alg value none) provide no integrity protection. Thus, they must only be used in contexts where the payload is secured by means other than a digital signature or MAC value, or need not be secured.
Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could send certificates with keys that would result in excessive cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the processing element. Agents that use such keys without first validating the certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some sort of cryptographic resource management system to prevent such attacks.
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[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
The following items remain to be considered or done in this draft:
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[CanvasApp]  Facebook, “Canvas Applications,” 2010. 
[ID.rescorlajsms]  Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, “JavaScript Message Security Format,” draftrescorlajsms00 (work in progress), March 2011 (TXT). 
[JCA]  Oracle, “Java Cryptography Architecture,” 2011. 
[JSE]  Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), “JSON Simple Encryption,” September 2010. 
[JSS]  Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), “JSON Simple Sign,” September 2010. 
[MagicSignatures]  Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, “Magic Signatures,” January 2011. 
[RFC3275]  Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, “(Extensible Markup Language) XMLSignature Syntax and Processing,” RFC 3275, March 2002 (TXT). 
[RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, “A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace,” RFC 4122, July 2005 (TXT, HTML, XML). 
[W3C.CRxmldsigcore220120124]  Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., Cantor, S., Roessler, T., Eastlake, D., Yiu, K., Solo, D., and P. Datta, “XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0,” World Wide Web Consortium CR CRxmldsigcore220120124, January 2012 (HTML). 
[W3C.CRxmlenccore120120313]  Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., and T. Roessler, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1,” World Wide Web Consortium CR CRxmlenccore120120313, March 2012 (HTML). 
[W3C.RECxmlenccore20021210]  Eastlake, D. and J. Reagle, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing,” World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation RECxmlenccore20021210, December 2002 (HTML). 
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This appendix contains a table crossreferencing the digital signature and MAC alg (algorithm) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. See XML DSIG (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, “(Extensible Markup Language) XMLSignature Syntax and Processing,” March 2002.) [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 (Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., Cantor, S., Roessler, T., Eastlake, D., Yiu, K., Solo, D., and P. Datta, “XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0,” January 2012.) [W3C.CR‑xmldsig‑core2‑20120124], and Java Cryptography Architecture (Oracle, “Java Cryptography Architecture,” 2011.) [JCA] for more information about the names defined by those documents.
Algorithm  JWS  XML DSIG  JCA  OID 

HMAC using SHA256 hash algorithm  HS256  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha256  HmacSHA256  1.2.840.113549.2.9 
HMAC using SHA384 hash algorithm  HS384  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha384  HmacSHA384  1.2.840.113549.2.10 
HMAC using SHA512 hash algorithm  HS512  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha512  HmacSHA512  1.2.840.113549.2.11 
RSASSA using SHA256 hash algorithm  RS256  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha256  SHA256withRSA  1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 
RSASSA using SHA384 hash algorithm  RS384  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha384  SHA384withRSA  1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 
RSASSA using SHA512 hash algorithm  RS512  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha512  SHA512withRSA  1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 
ECDSA using P256 curve and SHA256 hash algorithm  ES256  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha256  SHA256withECDSA  1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 
ECDSA using P384 curve and SHA384 hash algorithm  ES384  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha384  SHA384withECDSA  1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 
ECDSA using P521 curve and SHA512 hash algorithm  ES512  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha512  SHA512withECDSA  1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 
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This appendix contains a table crossreferencing the alg (algorithm) and enc (encryption method) values used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. See XML Encryption (Eastlake, D. and J. Reagle, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing,” December 2002.) [W3C.REC‑xmlenc‑core‑20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 (Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., and T. Roessler, “XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1,” March 2012.) [W3C.CR‑xmlenc‑core1‑20120313], and Java Cryptography Architecture (Oracle, “Java Cryptography Architecture,” 2011.) [JCA] for more information about the names defined by those documents.
Algorithm  JWE  XML ENC  JCA 

RSAESPKCS1V1_5  RSA1_5  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa1_5  RSA/None/PKCS1Padding 
RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)  RSAOAEP  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsaoaepmgf1p  RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA1AndMGF1Padding 
Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman Ephemeral Static  ECDHES  http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#ECDHES  
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm using 128 bit keys  A128KW  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwaes128  
AES Key Wrap Algorithm using 256 bit keys  A256KW  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwaes256  
AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding using 128 bit keys  A128CBC  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128cbc  AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding 
AES in CBC mode with PKCS #5 padding using 256 bit keys  A256CBC  http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256cbc  AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding 
AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) using 128 bit keys  A128GCM  http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128gcm  AES/GCM/NoPadding 
AES GCM using 256 bit keys  A256GCM  http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes256gcm  AES/GCM/NoPadding 
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Solutions for signing and encrypting JSON content were previously explored by Magic Signatures (Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, “Magic Signatures,” January 2011.) [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign (Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), “JSON Simple Sign,” September 2010.) [JSS], Canvas Applications (Facebook, “Canvas Applications,” 2010.) [CanvasApp], JSON Simple Encryption (Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), “JSON Simple Encryption,” September 2010.) [JSE], and JavaScript Message Security Format (Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, “JavaScript Message Security Format,” March 2011.) [I‑D.rescorla‑jsms], all of which influenced this draft. Dirk Balfanz, John Bradley, Yaron Y. Goland, John Panzer, Nat Sakimura, and Paul Tarjan all made significant contributions to the design of this specification and its related specifications.
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[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
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Michael B. Jones  
Microsoft  
Email:  mbj@microsoft.com 
URI:  http://selfissued.info/ 